Corruption and UN peace operations
While UN peace operations have made a significant contribution to international peace and security, their legitimacy and effectiveness has often been undermined by corruption – both among mission personnel and in the host country. The UN’s attempts to address corruption have included increasing monitoring and oversight and introducing better resource management systems. However, these mechanisms are inconsistent in their quality and rigour. Moreover, TI research indicates that both the organisation and the troop contributing nations need to work on the recruitment, preparation and oversight of mission personnel if corruption risks are to be mitigated.
This paper is based on an analysis of four UN missions: United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and one of its successor, UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBiH), peace operations in the DRC (MONUC and MONUSCO), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, replaced in 2017 by MINUJUSTH, the latter focusing on rule of law issues).
UNPROFOR/UNIMIBH and MINUSTAH/ MINUJUSTH were deployed during conflicts and expected to facilitate the conditions necessary to reaching a peaceful solution. The remaining missions, MONUC/MONUSCO and UNIMIL, were deployed in a post-conflict environment to monitor a ceasefire agreement.
- Mission size: All of the missions except for UNMIL began with an initial troop size of 5, 000 – 7, 000 personnel. UNMIL on the other hand, commenced with 15,000 personnel. Two missions expanded dramatically in size during their mandate with UNPROFOR/UNIMIBH reaching the strength of 38,599 military personnel and MONUC/MONUSCO of 17, 439 personnel.
- Mission duration: All of the missions were authorised for an initial period of 12 months and later extended. UNPROFOR/UNIMIBH went on for 10 years and UNMIL for 14. MONUC/MONUSCO and MINUSTAH/ MINUJUSTH are still in operation.
- Mission mandates and anti-corruption: Despite the legacy of poor governance, fragility and conflict in the host nations, only one mission mandate – that of UNMBiH, the successor of UNPROFOR – specifically mentioned tackling corruption from the start.[i] Corruption, however, has been present in UNMIL and MINUSTAH/ MINUJUSTH mandates, mostly identified as an issue within their host nations and relevant to the missions’ mandate to help reform the security and justice sectors.[ii] Only one mission mandate highlighted corruption issues at the mission itself: in 2018 the UN Security Council requested the Secretary-General to implement a zero-tolerance policy on several issues including corruption, at the MONUSCO mission.[iii]
Key corruption pathways and consequences to the mission
- Corruption among mission personnel: UN personnel in the missions surveyed have engaged in a variety of corrupt activities, starting from paying bribes in exchange for mission employment. Personnel were involved in illegal trade, from natural resources to drug smuggling; diverted resources from mission sustainment; and engaged in abuse of civilians, including sexual exploitation. This led to a waste of international resources; damaged the missions’ legitimacy; and in many cases directly contravened mandates tasking them to protect civilians.
- Relations with the host nation: widespread corruption and state capture in the host nation can tarnish the missions’ legitimacy, reputation and effectiveness, especially as missions usually need to maintain a relationship with the government. Host nation corruption also opens up opportunities for mission personnel to participate in corrupt activities.
- Assistance to civil power through protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance: empowered by their position as gatekeepers to vital resources and limited by the necessity to deliver supplies to vulnerable populations on territories they did not control, international missions have been both vulnerable to extortion and in a position to demand bribes. Diversion of humanitarian aid could prolong conflict by providing armed factions and gangs with the capacity and motivation to continue fighting.
- Partnering: corruption in the host nation security and defence forces: corruption in host nation forces, combined with international personnel’s participation in corrupt practices, has led to the illegal involvement of military personnel in the exploitation of natural resources. In countries where natural resources were one of the factors exacerbating conflict, this directly endangered mission goals such as DDR and protection of civilians, and has likely contributed to prolongation of conflict.
The UN and anti-corruption measures
- Selection and training of mission personnel: Some evidence suggests that contingents whose behaviour is monitored and evaluated by national governments generally display higher behavioural standards. However, these contingents are few and far between; overall, there are major shortcomings in how troop contributing nations select, train and pay the personnel they send to UN peace operations. In some cases, critics have claimed that reliance solely on training put in place by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) did not help prevent corruption and sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) risks due to lack of understanding and influence of a variety of institutional norms and practices.
- Investigations and sanctions: the UN’s audit and oversight architecture, most notably the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), have conducted investigations identifying misconduct among mission personnel. These bodies have, however, frequently been under-resourced and not sufficiently empowered to conduct in-depth investigations or be able to shape procedures. Applying sanctions has also been a challenge as these are usually the responsibility of troop contributing nations. While the UN does not sanction deployed personnel directly, since 2007 the Secretary General has monitored and reported on investigations and sanctions imposed nationally.
- Resource management systems: from ID cards to monitoring equipment such as CCTVs, UN missions have attempted to prevent diversion of resources.
- Training and capacity building: this has been the key way to attempt to mitigate corruption in host nation institutions. There is evidence that capacity building can lead to better performance and standards in defence and security institutions, but the efficacy of the programmes is often curtailed by their limited reach.
UN peacekeeping missions have been a fixture of the international environment since the 1950s, and have made a significant contribution to the preservation of peace and security.[iv] But they have also faced serious challenges which interfered with their efficacy and legitimacy. Among those, corruption and sexual exploitation and abuse are among the most troubling, undermining both the perception of UN missions and their ability to operate in fragile and conflict-affected environments.
The UN missions have been challenged on two fronts. One, they were seemingly ill-prepared to counter corruption among their own troops, resulting in diversion of materiel, kickbacks in contracting, troops participating in smuggling and illegal trade, payment of bribes in exchange for securing employment with the mission, and abuse of civilian populations in the countries where they deployed. Two, there have only been very limited efforts to understand the extent and manifestations of corruption in the host nation and their impact on mission goals and activities, as well as the impact that the deployment of a peacekeeping mission might have on corruption in a host country. This has led not only to waste of resources, but to loss of mission legitimacy, both internationally and in host countries. It also interfered with mission ability to achieve specific goals such as delivery of humanitarian assistance or protection of civilians.
This analysis tracks the pathways through which corruption manifested itself in selected peace operations, and discusses examples of mitigations and responses that the UN introduced in the last three decades. The sample of peace operations includes four missions:
- United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and one of its successors, UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBiH);
- Peace operations in the DRC (MONUC and MONUSCO);
- The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL);
- The UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, replaced in 2017 by MINUJUSTH, focused on rule of law issues).
These four missions encountered similar corruption-related issues, which suggests that corruption is a challenge that is unlikely to disappear; rather, the challenges it presents are likely to recur in future deployments. If they are to be prevented from undermining the UN’s peace operations, they need to be recognized and included in mission planning, and appropriate resourcing needs to be made available to implement mitigation measures.
UN peacekeeping operations
United Nations Protection Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-1995 & United Nations Mission in Bosnia (UNMBiH), 1995-2002
UNPROFOR was deployed in 1992, its presence prompted by as a war that followed the breakup of former Yugoslavia and had already resulted in approximately 102,622 casualties.[v] Starting out in Croatia, UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which saw some of the most ferocious fighting. In particular, UNPROFOR was responsible for:
- Protection of the Sarajevo airport during the siege of the city;
- Securing of ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina for humanitarian purposes;
- Protection of humanitarian aid convoys;
- Maintenance of ‘no-fly’ zones.[vi]
UNPROFOR had the strength of approximately 5,000 personnel, comprised of troops primarily from France, Russia, Ukraine, and Egypt. Six battalions were deployed around Sarajevo.[vii]
The Dayton Agreement of 1995 officially ended the war in former Yugoslavia and with it, the UNPROFOR mandate. Two NATO successive missions – the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) – were mandated to implement military aspects of the Dayton agreements and to support civilian organisations where possible.[viii] The UN’s work continued through the UNMBiH, whose primary task – along with reconstruction and repatriation of refugees – was supporting law enforcement activities and reform of law enforcement institutions.
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) & United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
MONUC was established in 2000, following four years of civil war between forces supporting former Congolese President Mobutu Sese Seko and those of Laurent Kabila, backed by Rwanda and Uganda. It was mandated to, among other tasks:
- Monitor and investigate the violations of the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement;
- Monitor and investigate human rights violations;
- Work with parties to the conflict to release prisoners of war;
- From 2004, protect civilians, deter violence in volatile areas, seize and collect arms and related material, and to report on the movement of armed groups.[ix]
MONUSCO took over from MONUC on 1 July 2010, with a mandate focused on longer-term stabilisation and peacebuilding tasks:
- Protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence;
- Supporting the Government of DRC in its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts.[x]
The MONUSCO deployment is ongoing and mission strength is at 18,316 as of 2018. Top troop contributors include Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and South Africa, with Egypt, Senegal and India leading police contributions.[xi]
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
UNMIL deployed to Liberia in 2003, following a civil war which engulfed the country in 1989-2003. UNMIL was established in 2003 to monitor the ceasefire following the resignation of then Prime Minister Charles Taylor, who had led one of the civil war factions. The UNMIL mandate sets out the following primary responsibilities:
- Protection of civilians;
- Reform of the justice and security institutions;
- Promotion and protection of human rights;
- Protection of United Nations personnel.[xii]
The mission had an initial troop strength of up to 15,000, including 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, around 875 UN police officers and an additional five armed units, each comprising 120 officers, a significant civilian component, and necessary support staff. The mission ended in June 2016, with some troops still on the ground in case of emergency until March 2018.[xiii] Top troop contributors included Nigeria, Ghana and Mali.
Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti / United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
Deployment of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (known by its French acronym as MINUSTAH) in June 2004 was a response to political instability and insecurity in Haiti, following the removal of President Bertrand Aristide and the subsequent competition for power between gangs and militia, previously armed by Aristide and used to prop up his regime.[xiv] Following Aristide’s departure, the gangs began searching for new sources of prestige and finance, including organised crime, and nurtured links with political actors.[xv] Local gang leaders raised ‘protection money’ by levying ‘rents’ on the population, imposing extra payments on remittances, and extorting payments for access to infrastructure such as the main national north-south highway, water taps, and local medical clinics within the territory under their control. They also buttressed their legitimacy through sporadic charitable distribution of food and consumer goods purchased with the proceeds of their criminal activities.[xvi]
MINUSTAH’s principal mandate included:
- Establishing a secure and stable environment within which Haitian constitutional and political processes could take place;
- Maintaining law and order and public safety;
- Support for elections;
- Promotion and protection of human rights;
- Disaster relief in the aftermath of the 2008 storms and the 2010 earthquake.[xvii]
In 2010, an earthquake added complexity to the situation as a humanitarian disaster loomed. Post-2010, MINUSTAH became the fifth-largest and third-most expensive UN mission, with 7,283 military, 3,126 police personnel, and 2,143 civilians. [xviii] Brazil, Nepal, and Sri Lanka were among the top troop contributing nations.
MINUSTAH was disbanded in 2017 and replaced by MINUJUSTH, focused on issues of justice and rule of law.
Postings with the UN peace operations can be lucrative due to higher salaries and generous allowances, such as per diems and danger pay. They can also influence officers’ future careers, as in some armed forces international experience is needed to progress through the ranks. These postings can, therefore, be desirable and can be at risk of bribery, especially where accountability and procedural safeguards are lacking. For UN missions, it can mean that posts are filled by people who might not be qualified to do their jobs. Moreover, officers who needed to pay a bribe for a posting could be induced to seek illegal income during the posting, to make up for the cost outlay; this can prompt them to extort bribes elsewhere, or engage in illegal activities such as smuggling.
OIOS investigations in 2014 found that eight police officers from Côte d’Ivoire had paid bribes to Ivorian counterparts to secure deployments to MINUSTAH and MONUSCO.[xix] OIOS concluded, for example, that the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Cote d’Ivoire mission charged $4,000 to arrange placements in MONUSCO, abusing the professional position which allowed him to select and promote UN personnel.[xx] Corruption and bribery in employment also affected the host nation, as local staff paid kickbacks to UN personnel to secure employment.[xxi]
During the deployment in Bosnia, UNPROFOR’s position as protector and gatekeeper of the besieged Sarajevo, as well as its control of the city’s airport, exposed the force to a number of corruption issues. The imperative to deliver humanitarian aid, combined with the influence that the Bosnian Serbs had over the process as they laid siege to Sarajevo, made the UN force both vulnerable to extortion and in a position to make a profit. Control over the Sarajevo airport enabled UNPROFOR troops to take bribes in exchange for looking the other way while items were being smuggled in and out of the city, or to play a more active role and participate in moving black market goods into the city and people out of it.[xxii] It is alleged that Ukrainian soldiers allowed individuals to pass over the airport tarmac for 100 to 200 German marks (DM) per head,[xxiii] and smuggled Bosnian Serbs out of Sarajevo to Pale in Republika Srpska for 1,000 DM per person. French troops, on the other hand, reportedly smuggled people in armoured personnel carriers for 500 to 2,000 DM per head. Seats were also sold on humanitarian aid flights for 1,000 to 2,000 DM.[xxiv]
UNPROFOR troops also participated in illegal trade feeding Sarajevo’s black markets and used their status with the UN to smuggle items in protected UN vehicles and aircraft, avoiding search and seizure. Members of the Ukrainian component, for example, would smuggle fuel siphoned from their armoured personnel carriers into Sarajevo, to be sold on the black market.[xxv] They also illegally transported cars out of the city to Belgrade in UN containers, where they would acquire false documentation and travel on to Ukraine to be sold.[xxvi] Canadian members of UNPROFOR also allegedly sold cigarettes, alcohol, coffee, fuel, clothing, and in one case, weaponry, on the black market in besieged towns.[xxvii]
Food sold by UNPROFOR troops in Sarajevo, whilst earning them a profit and channelling resources to illegal networks, also eased conditions for the besieged population, especially when aid deliveries were not sufficient.[xxviii] But UNPROFOR’s role in arms smuggling in Sarajevo may have contributed to prolonging the conflict, as the trade benefitted both sides. Turkish and Malaysian soldiers were involved in smuggling light arms from Croatia to Bosnia totalling up to $15 million; Bangladeshi troops engaged in large-scale trade of ammunition to the Bosnian military.[xxix] Ukrainian soldiers reportedly sold their own weapons on the black market in Zepa, a Serbian area in Bosnia that is now part of Republika Srpska.[xxx] French Foreign Legion troops were reported to have used UN vehicles to smuggle ammunition and weapons from one side of the airport runway to the other, and the UNPROFOR battalion from Malta ordered 4,000 mortar shells – despite possessing only four mortars.[xxxi]
In the DRC, MONUSCO troops were accused of trading gold, ivory, and weapons with rebel forces, in particular Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI).[xxxii] UN troops reportedly used a UN helicopter to fly into Virunga national park to exchange ammunition for ivory, traded UN rations for gold, and purchased drugs from rebels.[xxxiii] Pakistani troops were accused of trading gold with the FNI militia and arming them to guard the perimeter of gold mines in the area;[xxxiv] this has been publicly confirmed by FNI leaders and by local communities.[xxxv]
The Front, however, had a formidable human rights abuse record, including allegations of killings among local communities.[xxxvi] By trading with the FNI, MONUSCO personnel directly undermined their mandate to disarm rebel organisations, monitor their human rights abuses and protect civilians. [xxxvii]
Mission sustainment in a fragile or conflict-affected environment is frequently carried out under the pressure of timelines and urgent operational requirements, and with less accountability than usual. It is therefore more vulnerable to abuses, including overcharging, theft, and bribery in the contracting process. Limited oversight opens up opportunities for abuse by mission personnel, while the mission’s access to key materiel – such as fuel – can create incentives to divert it and make a profit through illegal trade.
In one instance of fraud and corruption, the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) repeatedly raised concerns regarding Abdul Karim Masri, a UN official serving for seven years in DRC, over reports of frequent demands for bribes. Masri, who had been accused of fraud and overcharging in Syria and Rwanda before coming to the DRC, was reportedly at the centre of a wide-reaching corruption network within MONUSCO’s purchasing department.
The unit alleged that Masri accepted a $10,000 bribe from a boating company, steered a lucrative catering contract to a friend, and persuaded one UN contractor to paint his apartment and swimming pool at no cost and another to give him a steep discount on a Mercedes-Benz. It also described an effort by Masri to solicit a kickback from a construction executive on a $5.5 million contract to refurbish an airfield in eastern Congo.
In August 2000, five months after Masri arrived in Congo, rumours of his involvement in corrupt activities there appeared in a local newspaper, l’Avenir. A subsequent OIOS investigation found that a contractor had leased Masri a Mercedes for $250 a month, well below market value. But OIOS did not make a case against Masri, recommending instead that staff members should be transferred “if their behavior does not change to avoid bad press for the organization and its staff.
It was seven more years before Masri was placed on leave and barred from doing U.N. business.’ [xxxviii]
The Washington Post, 2007
Fuel, a valuable and often indispensable commodity, is particularly vulnerable to diversion. UNMIL’s fuel unit, for example, reported 34 cases of suspected fraud between January and March 2017, noting the loss of 92,000 litres of fuel valued at $64,000, through excessive refuelling of vehicles and theft from bulk deliveries.[xxxix] A similar audit of MINSUTAH’s fuel management revealed significant corruption vulnerabilities, including lack of a long-term contract for ground or aviation fuel supplies – something that could expose the mission to risks as it attempted to procure fuel under pressure and within short deadlines.[xl] The mission’s key fuel supplier had also been investigated for possibly erroneous invoices of over $688,000 and delivery shortages totalling 17,608 gallons, between August 2007-June 2008. There were also reports of deliveries of sub-standard quality fuel (instead of the higher-quality type that was ordered) that did not meet UN standards and could have damaged UN equipment.[xli]
Sexual exploitation and abuse affect many vulnerable populations in fragile and conflict states, with dependence on others for basic supplies, power disparities and lack of recourse when abuses do happen constituting some of the major risk factors. UN peace operations, with international forces frequently acting as gatekeepers to basic resources, and where lines of accountability are often blurred, have repeatedly struggled with international personnel’s involvement in sexual exploitation and abuse.
MONUSCO peacekeepers in the DRC, for example, used their position and access to food and other essential resources to demand sexual favours from local populations. A UN report noted that SEA usually involves sex being exchanged for money (on average $1-$3 per encounter), for food (for immediate consumption or to barter later), or for access to employment.[xlii] In some cases, victims described being raped and given money or food afterwards to give the rape the appearance of a consensual transaction, and to create dependency.[xliii] Sexual exploitation and abuse allegations in MONUSCO and its predecessor MONUC came to a total of 214 reports, or 45 per cent of all peacekeeping-related sexual exploitation allegations between 2008 and 2013.[xliv]
In the UN’s mission to Liberia – UNMIL – SEA reached endemic proportions. Research surveys (over 1,400) and in-depth interviews (475) with women between 18-30 years old in greater Monrovia found that about half reported having engaged in sex in exchange for money, three quarters of those encounters being with UN personnel.[xlv] The research estimated that almost 58,000 women between the ages of 18-30 years in Monrovia had engaged in transactional sex with a UN peacekeeper during 2012, much higher than the official numbers registered by the UN. The researchers concluded that a woman’s chance of reaching the age of 25 without engaging in transactional sex would be 50% greater if there were no UNMIL troops in Monrovia. [xlvi]
Meeting basic needs also propelled SEA cases in Haiti, with MINUSTAH personnel accused of demanding sex in return for food and medication.[xlvii] Sri Lankan troops have been particularly singled out as perpetrators of sexual abuse in Haiti: from 2004 to 2007, 134 Sri Lankan peacekeepers were involved in a child sex ring, using candy and cash to lure them.[xlviii] Over 100 Sri Lankan soldiers were also reported for soliciting prostitution.[xlix]
Working in a country where a corrupt government controls state institutions and, frequently, the lucrative exploitation of natural resources, poses both reputational and effectiveness challenges to peace operations. A relationship with the government is usually necessary as UN deployments tend to occur with government approval; the risk is that they can then be seen as supporting governments that lack legitimacy and are often ineffective and abusive toward their own populations. This could not only result in reputational risks, but also affect the mission’s efficacy as it struggles with resentment and lack of trust. It requires a careful strategy to manage the implications, not only in terms of strategic communications, but also the balance between working with the government and pressuring it to improve governance.
During the siege of Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb leadership used their position of power – as besiegers, they controlled access to the city[liii] – to impose terms on UNHCR and UNPROFOR’s delivery of aid into Sarajevo. Through an agreement on the status of the airport, Bosnian Serb forces gained the authority to approve all aid coming through Sarajevo airport, with 23% of aid designated for the city to be handed over to their units.[liv] The agreement also affected land convoys passing through the airport in winters, when runways were not usable.[lv]
Additionally, UNHCR would have to bribe Serb checkpoint guards, most commonly with whiskey and cigarettes, to move aid supplies into the city. The Bosnian Serb forces (the VRS) would on occasion deliberately stall aid convoys (sometimes for up to 15 days) by firing at them, to create food shortages in Sarajevo and therefore prompt price hikes on the black market.[lvi] At checkpoints, the VRS would similarly delay aid convoys in order to pressure drivers to offer bribes in exchange for passage.[lvii]
A lack of oversight and control over the aid supply chain also facilitated corruption. Local UNHCR drivers and warehouse workers, enabled by their UN IDs (‘blue cards’) allowing passage for humanitarian aid, exploited their access to resources and means of transportation. This ranged from small-scale theft for personal use to large-scale abuses for profit. Manipulating the counting system at these warehouses further enabled aid to be abused, creating false recipient names or keeping those that had deceased or left the city on the system. Inflating requirements for institutions such as hospitals also allowed supplies to be diverted, often to the Bosnian Army: one former UNHCR aid monitor has estimated that more than 20% of humanitarian aid was diverted to the Bosnian army.[lviii] Finally, organised schemes also included drivers accepting bribes to stage accidents, so that fuel could be siphoned from trucks and sold on the black market.[lix]
The consequences of diversion of humanitarian aid varied. The most obvious consequence was waste of resources and increases in costs: during the war in Bosnia, aid agencies typically expected to lose approximately 30% of their load through theft, hijacking, ‘tolls’ and skimming at checkpoints, many of which were set up only to extort bribes from aid convoys.[lx] Diversion contributed to prolonging the conflict through providing supplies to the fighting units. But abuse of humanitarian aid also brought into questions the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN missions. In Srebrenica the diversion of aid by the military and government officials created visible inequalities, which soured relationships between the population and the local leaders. Anger was often aimed at UNHCR, who had no Srebrenica-based staff to oversee distribution, and the Dutch UNPROFOR contingent, DUTCHBAT.[lxi]
UNHCR has also admitted that that the number of groups and individuals carrying its ID cards – which enabled access to humanitarian resources and access to war zones – became too many to effectively control. The association with the UN, used to further fraud and abuse, was a significant reputational risk for the international community.
Some had dubious links with the warring parties, fundamentalist groups, mercenaries, secret intelligence agencies, arms smugglers, and black-marketeers. Since all worked under one banner, all were tarred with the same brush. As a result, the humanitarian community in general was sometimes treated with mistrust, suspicion, resentment and even outright hostility, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs.[lxii]
Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets & Black Markets, 2008
Access to indispensable goods during the conflict has also fed local criminal organisations and empowered war profiteers, able to make significant profit on the basis of access to humanitarian resources: one former Bosnian politician claimed that some war profiteers became millionaires in a matter of months by smuggling humanitarian aid.[lxiii] In the longer term, the criminal networks of war profiteers, corrupt government officials and Bosnian Serb forces became difficult to disentangle. Government officials, in collaboration with criminals, accumulated cars, companies, shops, and restaurants. Their involvements with criminals in these acquirements meant that the gangs had considerable leverage over them and could exert influence on political decisions.[lxiv]
The design of the Dayton peace accords and lack of action from Bosnian authorities after the war helped entrench the networks which grew on wartime profiteering, including diversion of humanitarian aid. The peace settlement was organised through the ethnic lens, producing an agreement that sought to contain ethno-nationalist hatreds and neglected the shadow economy, more and more entrenched: in 2002, the World Bank estimated that the shadow economy constituted up to 50 to 60 per cent of Bosnia’s GDP.[lxv] Issues related to corruption are still present two decades later, and constitute one of the most significant challenges for the Bosnian state.[lxvi]
In BiH, the ruling nationalist parties extended a post-war amnesty for deserters to include “economic crimes” committed from the start of 1991 to the end of 1995, including the misuse of humanitarian aid. This immunised those politicians and wartime commanders who were otherwise vulnerable to investigation and enabled thousands of others to safeguard their wartime gains and to consolidate their economic control. Command and influence in the peacetime political economy could then be exerted through clientelism, rentier fraud, corporatism, privatisation processes, and continued interethnic and regional collaboration. [lxvii]
Michael Pugh, ‘Post-war Political Economy in Bosnia’, 2002
MONUSCO in the DRC was one mission struggling with corruption in partner forces, the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Congo (FARDC). Corrupt military officers would frequently siphon off military funding, leaving field commanders without sufficient resources to cover the cost of salaries and basic supplies. Rank-and-file soldiers were encouraged to make their living off the local population, often resorting to extortion and abuse. As local communities would often find it difficult to differentiate rebels from peacekeepers based on uniforms alone, much of the population mistrusted and feared peacekeepers dispatched to their communities just as much as they feared FARDC.[lxviii]
Corruption in the FARDC also led to the formation of business relationships with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel armed group. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, a MONUSCO official confirmed that a senior FARDC military officer had admitted to passing information, logistical support, and uniforms to the ADF; FARDC had also pursued business deals with the ADF, particularly involving timber and minerals. [lxix]
MONUSCO’s mandate, while it did have a wide scope of responsibilities, did not address the armed groups’ looting of natural resources, even though the practice contributed to human rights abuses and prolonged conflict as warring groups use the country’s wealth to consolidate their economic bases and trading networks.[lxx] Much of the fighting between FARDC and rebel groups is concentrated around sites rich in natural resources, particularly gold; [lxxi] therefore FARDC’s participation in the looting of resources contributed to insecurity and undermined MONUSCO’s ability to contain the conflict and protect civilian populations.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) – usually involving a financial reward for turning in weapons and agreeing to leave militia or insurgent groups – can also pose corruption-related challenges, mainly by providing an opportunity to divert resources. The UNMIL mission in Liberia, responsible for the DDR of all non-state actors, disarmed and demobilised 103,019 combatants between 2003 and 2005, almost three times more than the expected 38,000. The discrepancy was most likely due to commanders ‘selling’ a place in a DDR programme, which paid out benefits to ex-combatants in exchange for demobilisation, to friends and family members posing as ‘fake insurgents’; in some cases, commanders handed out previously confiscated guns that could then be traded in.[lxxii] In the DRC, weapons confiscated through DDR programmes were later used by MONUSCO troops to arm rebel groups and task them to guard the perimeter of gold mines in the area, sharing the profits of gold exploitation and trade.[lxxiii] These schemes do not only waste international resources, but also contribute to continued instability and insecurity underpinned by links to rebel groups and flows of weapons.
While in most cases countering corruption was not directly included in the UN mandates, efforts to prevent abuses among UN personnel and to build host nation institutions did target corrupt practices, aiming to better prevent and detect them. These include beefed-up investigative and audit bodies, attempts to put in place more effective materiel management systems, and capacity building for host nation institutions, with perhaps the most visible attempt at curbing corruption being the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which has since its establishment uncovered significant instances of wrongdoing.
For a full assessment of the UN’s preparedness to address corruption at the HQ level, see TI-DS analysis here.
The experience of the French Gendarmerie Nationale, among others, suggests that the contingents whose behaviour was monitored and evaluated (for example through comprehensive evaluations at the end of their tour) had higher standards of conduct.[lxxvi] It could thus be worthwhile for TCCs to design systems in which performance and conduct of officers deployed abroad would be subject to evaluations and would have an impact on their future careers. However, most top TCCs have had low standards of defence governance that create risks of bad performance during deployments. TI research has shown that as of 2015/2016, top 25 TCCs struggled with nepotism and bribery in their recruitment and promotion systems; most did not apply sanctions when deployed personnel breached standards of conduct or engaged in criminal activity; and despite risks, there was almost no anti-corruption training or monitoring in the field.[lxxvii]
The United Nations could, however, explore options to press for implementation of better recruitment standards, better monitoring, and a more effective sanction system. One option is through centralised pre-deployment training for all troops, and through putting in place mission-wide monitoring and investigative systems. The Secretary-General could also shape national contributions by setting out the standards that TPCCs should meet, including the training and abilities expected of troops and police and commitments to ensure that personnel that have been involved in crimes are not sent to the field. The report should be available publicly, and could help push for measures that help peace operations mitigate some of the corruption risks affecting their own personnel.
OIOS investigations and their outcomes suggest that a dedicated audit and oversight capacity is desirable and effective. In 2014, the UN’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) followed up on OIOS’s findings of bribery in the Ivorian MINUSTAH contingent by suspending Côte d’Ivoire’s police deployments until a national investigation addressed OIOS’s findings and the necessary measures had been taken.[lxxx] However, the organisation is severely understaffed and struggles with limits in its scope, meaning that it is often unable to conduct investigations at the level of depth necessary, and can miss evidence of misconduct and wrongdoing by UN personnel that is later uncovered by independent investigations. Human Rights Watch, for example, criticised OIOS for giving way to political pressure to maintain mission troop numbers rather than upset troop contributing nations and therefore did not fully investigate claims.[lxxxi]
The monitoring architecture is also primarily reactive and not proactive. While the UN does deploy trained professionals to monitor and evaluate a variety of areas that relate to corruption risks, none specifically monitor corruption or corruption risks. OIOS investigations are also chiefly reactive, with Office investigators only deploying to the field in response to an allegation or complaint. Attempts to be more proactive and risk-based were limited by funding. The OIOS evaluation division does act more proactively, though there are similar resource challenges.
Moreover, UN investigations into wrongdoing have often been ineffective and rarely resulted in action as the UN feared offending contributing nations.[lxxxii] For example, Austrian General Gunther Grindl was sent to Sarajevo to investigate reports of misconduct among UNPROFOR troops but apparently did not speak to locals and refused to acknowledge that systemic issues, rather than isolated cases of misconduct, existed.[lxxxiii] Similarly in the DRC, an OIOS investigation of alleged trade between UN troops and rebels concluded that only one peacekeeper had been involved to a significant extent. OIOS conclusions were criticised by Human Rights watch and the BBC, with the latter suspecting that fear of offending the largest troop contributor to the mission was responsible for the UN blocking more damning evidence.[lxxxiv]
Bodies conducting investigations and audits into the UN’s operations have also struggled with appropriate resourcing and competences. An audit into MINUSTAH fuel supply also led the UN to charge five employees with misconduct after they were found to have steered a $10 million-a-year fuel contract to DINASA. The investigating task force was unable to prove the accused profited from the scheme, citing their lack of authority to subpoena bank records, but it recommended that the case be referred for criminal prosecution by authorities in Haiti or the United States, who had appropriate powers.[lxxxv]
Sanctions were similarly weak and inconsistently applied. The UN is, as a rule, not able to sanction individual troops, which continues to be a prerogative of national authorities. During UNPROFOR’s operations, 383 troops were repatriated due to misconduct in 1992-1994, with the numbers varying widely between contingents. Despite widespread signs of corruption, UNPROFOR struggled to devise a code of conduct that was universally acceptable to all TCCs. Thus, although UNPROFOR could recommend individuals be repatriated, each national contingent was responsible for the discipline of its own troops according to its own military code.[lxxxvi]
In the case of MINUSTAH, where SEA cases were abundant, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the UN and each TCC gave the UN (both field office and secretariat) a minimal role to play in allegations of sexual misconduct. TCCs conduct their own investigations into allegations involving their own military personnel and determine the punishment. The UN reviews the case and can urge faster-follow up but has no investigative or punitive powers in the cases.[lxxxvii]
However, since 2007 the UN has made attempts to monitor the application of investigations and sanctions in troop contributing countries. Following resolution 63/63, adopted in 2007, the Secretary General also presents an annual report to the General Assembly on ‘Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission.’ The report accounts for the number and nature of cases involving credible allegations of criminal conduct against United Nations officials and experts on mission, which have been referred to troop contributing countries. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 70/114, the Secretary-General’s reports also include information on the United Nations entity involved; the type of crime and summary of allegations; and the status of any investigation, prosecutorial and/or disciplinary action taken by national authorities.
Similarly, countering sexual exploitation and abuse has been deemed a priority for the new Secretary General Antonio Gutierrez, and leadership positions such as a Victims’ Rights Advocate and a Special Coordinator for improving the UN’s response to SEA have been created. The UN and member states have also committed to creating a ‘Circle of Leadership’, bringing together national and UN leadership to push for SEA prevention and mitigation measures.
OIOS investigations have also shown shortcomings in other elements of the UN’s monitoring and investigative architecture, especially its ability to encourage whistleblowers and provide channels for reporting when abuses do occur. An investigation into sexual exploitation and abuse in Haiti revealed that only seven interviewees, out of more than 200 the investigators spoke to, knew about the UN policy prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse. None knew of MINUSTAH’s reporting mechanism or its hotline, suggesting that neither the design of reporting mechanisms nor the availability of information were fit for purpose.[lxxxviii] Therefore, the good practice of introducing whistleblower hotlines needs to be supported by a widespread information outreach aiming to familiarise mission personnel and local stakeholders with the options available to them.
An ID card and licence plate system was also introduced to manage the delivery of humanitarian supplies in Bosnia and to ensure that only approved suppliers had access to materiel and to routes enabling it to be moved. However, this created yet another system to monitor and brought about a whole set of problems caused by lax due diligence, attempts to sell, forge and re-use the cards, and by draft-age men posing as humanitarian workers to cross the checkpoints and get out of the country.[xc]
Throughout the war there was a constant queue of people requesting UNHCR ID cards and registration plates. UNHCR found itself having to make quick decisions about whether or not to grant these, often based on very meagre background information. Many of those who were granted ID cards belonged to organisations which had never been heard of before. Some belonged to organisations which had only been created the previous day. In some cases, individual philanthropists were granted ID cards. In one case, a clown was given a card, to enable him to provide entertainment for children in the war zone.[xci]
Mark Cutts, The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1999
In a similar attempt to limit diversion of mission resources – this time focused on fuel supplies – UNMIL’s Fuel Unit utilised CCTV recordings, spot-checks at main fuel distribution points, requirement for a regional administrative officer or representative to witness the transfer of fuel to stations in the region, and records of drivers entering fuel stations to prevent further theft. The Fuel Unit helped to strengthen controls such as collecting information from the Electronic Fuel Management System to identify discrepancies, required vendors to deliver fuel to UNMIL with staff acknowledging receipt, and reduced the number of fuel stations and fuel reserves in order to better control them.[xcii] The main limitation of these measures is the additional cost they create; however, given that they prevent diversion of resources and can help limit illegal trade, the calculus is often in their favour.
Alongside challenges in defence forces, all peace operations we surveyed struggled with corruption in police forces, both in host nation institutions and among police officers deployed as UN personnel. Police corruption is a microcosm of the corruption risks affecting missions overall, from resource diversion to abuse of civilians. It is also particularly problematic in fragile and conflict-affected states. As police scholar David Bayley has noted, ‘[t]he police are to government as the edge is to the knife’,[xciv] with potential to protect, but also to do serious harm.
In the DRC, the MONUC and MONUSCO missions operated alongside a police force lacking resources, salaries and benefits, and unified recruitment and performance standards. The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services noted that years of neglect – in resourcing, structuring and training the police force – resulted in widespread corruption as police officers made up for irregularly paid salaries and conducted illegal operations with impunity. Allegations of physical abuse by the police were particularly problematic, creating mistrust and resentment among civilians.[xcv] In Liberia, Human Rights Watch found low police salaries and bribes extorted in exchange for employment incentivised police officers to prey on civilian populations, especially vulnerable groups. Acknowledging the magnitude of the problem, UNMIL has stated that poor conduct and corruption within the police threatens peace and stability.[xcvi]
MINUSTAH in Haiti also faced systemic corruption in the Haitian national police (PNH), politicised by former President Bertrand Aristide.[xcvii] Corruption has led to the sacking of the police’s chief of procurement and 252 other officers in 2007. That same year, the second largest drug seizure in Haiti’s history – conducted by MINUSTAH and PNH – confiscated 420kg of cocaine, with a retail value of 5-10 per cent of Haiti’s annual budget. Half of those arrested during the sweep were police officers.[xcviii]
Peace operations attempted to curtail corruption in the police chiefly through training and, in some cases, institutional capacity building. UN Police (UNPOL) working alongside MINUSTAH provided advice on operational procedures, investigations and community policing, and helped establish a national crime statistics and analysis database.[xcix] But the transitional government’s unwillingness to support MINUSTAH’s mandate delayed vetting and hindered counter-corruption efforts.[c]
Beginning in 2007, MINUSTAH UNPOL also supported and provided advice for developing guidelines for PNH’s recruitment, vetting, training, certification, and sensitisation of officers. Even though the majority of officers who failed a joint MINUSTAH/PNH vetting process have still not been dismissed,[ci] the process did have some success, with MINUSTAH’s leadership credited with improving the police’s operational effectiveness and recruiting five classes of new, vetted and educated cadets.[cii]
In 2012, MINUSTAH helped establish the office of the Inspector General for the Haitian police force. The IG is responsible for accepting and investigating any allegations of police wrongdoing. Complaints can be submitted through the two toll-free hotlines, one going directly to the PNH and another to MINUSTAH.[ciii] However, the IG has been criticised on a number of fronts, including lack of appropriate resources and training and slow responses to allegations of wrongdoing, especially unjustified pre-trial detention.[civ] In addition, there is a general lack of public awareness about filing complaints and inconsistent functioning of the complaint phone line.[cv]
Training and capacity building have also been UNPOL’s responses to challenges in the DRC and Liberia. In the DRC, UNPOL officers deployed with MONUSCO supported police restructuring and offered training in police procedure and best practice, as well as in human rights; by 2014, 4,400 police across DRC were trained. Those efforts, however, were hampered by lack of resources – the Congolese police force was estimated at 110,000 in 2010 and the plan is for it to eventually reach 150,000 officers, a formidable number to train – and limited support from the government. [cvi] As of 2016-2018, concerns regarding the police force’s brutality, partisanship and bribery abounded.[cvii]
UNPOL reportedly fared better in Liberia, where its efforts to train the police, co-locate its advisers in police stations around Monrovia, conduct joint patrols, provide security in prisons, and conduct community engagement were positively assessed by Human Rights Watch. While problems remain, HRW noted that UNPOL engagement helped decrease instances of abuse in detention and has helped professionalise the police force overall.[cviii]
The UN Mission to Bosnia & Herzegovina similarly (UNMBiH) spearheaded the effort to help create professional and capable law enforcement institutions. The police reform programme addressed the issue of political interference in the police by establishing independent police commissioners at the canton level and directors of police at the entity level. UNIMBH also helped accredit individual police officers before they took up their posts, checking their backgrounds, professional performance, educational credentials, completion of IPTF compulsory training, proof of citizenship, and a criminal record check. Of 44,000 police personnel, including administrative staff, 23,751 officers were registered, and 481 officers were denied certification.[cix] UNMBiH-sponsored State Border Service (SBS) also reportedly helped reduce human trafficking and smuggling, and generated over $1.2 million for the Treasury in the first nine months of 2002, of which almost $900,000 was in seized goods.[cx] All Border Service police officers received an UNIMBH designed training package, which included courses such as a weeklong human dignity course and other specialised transition training.[cxi]
But corruption risks can equally affect UN police officers deployed with missions. The UN’s International Police Task Force in Bosnia – 1,832 police officers deployed in the aftermath of the Dayton accords – was mandated to monitor the activities of the domestic police force, to limit human rights abuses, and improve the standards of policing. However, the IPTF struggled with recruitment, chain of command, accountability, and significant corrupt and abusive practices. Numerous reports emerged of sexual exploitation by IPTF monitors, sometimes directly complicit as guards, clients, informants and partial owners of prostitution rings and brothels: one assessment estimates that IPTF monitors contributed to 70% of brothel incomes.[cxii] Women and girls were often driven to the apartments of Pakistani IPTF monitors (whose contingent chief also served as head of the internal investigations unit) and forced to provide sexual services to them. US police officers were also accused of statutory rapes and abetting prostitution in exchange for valuable gifts.[cxiii] DynCorp, an American company responsible for IPTF recruitment in the US, fired a whistleblower who reported US monitors’ involvement in trafficking women.[cxiv]
As international police had diplomatic immunity from prosecution in Bosnia, and unless their governments waived that immunity, the most severe punishment the UN could impose on renegade officers was to send them home. Repatriation ensured that misconduct could be hushed up without a full investigation. [cxv] The UN feared that strict consequences for those implicated would undermine their ability to attract new recruits.[cxvi] Despite allegations of serious misconduct among the US contingent, no IPTF monitors were prosecuted and the most serious punishment imposed on an American officer was dismissal and the loss of a $4,600 bonus.[cxvii] This would likely have led to a culture of impunity among deployed and deploying IPTF monitors.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Following high-profile deployments – and high-profile scandals – in the 1990s, the UN did put in place anti-corruption safeguards such as the Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS), charged with preventing and detecting corruption and fraud. It has also adopted rules and regulations governing both staff and financial resources, as well as related guidance to prevent and control misconduct and corruption. Finally, in a key development, the UN has recognised that corruption can contribute to conflict and needs to be considered in the analysis and planning leading up to a deployment.
A United Nations peace operation should ensure that its country analysis encompasses the dynamics and drivers of corruption, advocate for appropriate attention to corruption and provide political support to those providing technical assistance in that area.[cxviii]
UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015
However, notwithstanding the UN’s continuing efforts, both it and TCCs need to take more systematic action to reduce corruption risk in international missions. The recognition that corruption matters in peace operations has only selectively trickled down to the operational and tactical levels. There is no general UN Peacekeeping policy on tackling corruption as part of a mission and it is largely exempt from key documents. The UN’s capstone doctrine, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, only mentions corruption once, as a sector in the rule of law.[cxix] Similarly the DPKO Planning Toolkit only refers to corruption six times in a 161-page document, again as a rule of law indicator.[cxx] As far as we could ascertain, it is also not mentioned in either Volume 1 or 2 of the UN Infantry Battalion Manual,[cxxi] leaving a lot of ground uncovered. This means that even if effective measures are introduced in one of the missions, they might not necessarily be identified and passed on to others.
MINUSTAH’s doctrines, force profile and programming (especially in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – DDR) was organised on rather “traditional” lines, to deal with the threat posed by politically motivated armed groups. [cxxii]
James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, Peace Operations and Organised Crime, 2011
Second, missions suffer from shortcomings in personnel recruitment, training and preparation, all usually controlled by troop contributing nations. Earlier TI research has shown that the top 25 troop contributing countries have very weak recruitment systems for UN operations, often undermined by bribery; limited sanctions for wrongdoing; little to no doctrine preparing troops to tackle corruption in operational environments; and a lack of transparency in the matter of financial reimbursements from the UN.[cxxiii]
Third, the UN’s reporting and investigative mechanisms – from whistleblower hotlines to dedicated investigative task forces – have also been hampered by lack of resources, mandates and competences enabling them to provide effective oversight. But perhaps most importantly, the UN’s overall integrity and performance depends on the standards implemented and protected by national authorities of the troop contributing countries, and these vary dramatically.
UN peace operations are far too important a feature of today’s international environment to allow shortcomings in mandates, resourcing and recruitment to facilitate corrupt practices affecting their effectiveness. As the demand for the UN’s contribution to maintaining peace and security is unlikely to wane, both the UN itself and its troop contributing nations need to take steps to prevent corruption for undermining its future missions.
All online sources were accessed between November 2016-November 2018.
[i]UN Security Council resolution 1168/1998, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3883rd meeting, on 21 May 1998. S/RES/1168 (1998).
[ii]UN Security Council resolution 2313/2016, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7790th meeting, on 13 October 2016, S/RES/2313/2016; UN Security Council resolution 2410/2018, Adopted by the Security Council at its 8226th meeting, on 10 April 2018, S/RES/2410/2018; UN Security Council resolution 1712/2006, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5542nd meeting, on 29 September 2006, S/RES/1712 (2006); UN Security Council resolution 1750/2007, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5652nd meeting, on 30 March 2007, S/RES/1750 (2007); UN Security Council resolution 1777/2007, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5745th meeting on 20 September 2007, S/RES/1777 (2007); UN Security Council resolution 1836/2008, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5985th meeting, on 29 September 2008, S/RES/1836 (2008); UN Security Council resolution 1885/2009, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6188th meeting, on 15 September 2009, S/RES/1885 (2009); UN Security Council resolution 1938/2010, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6383rd meeting, on 15 September 2010, S/RES/1938 (2010); UN Security Council resolution 2008/2011, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6619th meeting, on 16 September 2011, S/RES/2008 (2011); UN Security Council resolution 2066/2012, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6834th meeting, on 17 September 2012, S/RES/2066 (2012); UN Security Council resolution 2190/2014, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7340th meeting, on 15 December 2014, S/RES/2190 (2014); UN Security Council resolution 2239/2015, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7525th meeting, on 17 September 2015, S/RES/2239 (2015); UN Security Council resolution 2308/2016, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7770th meeting, on 14 September 2016, S/RES/2308/2016; UN Security Council resolution 2333/2016, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7851st meeting, on 23 December 2016, S/RES/2333/2016.
[iii] UN Security Council resolution 2409/2018, Adopted by the Security Council at its 8216th meeting, on 27 March 2018, S/RES/2409 (2018).
[iv] Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002, pp. 105 & passim; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton University Press: Oxford, 2006)
[v] Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, Casualties of the 1990s War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and the Latest Results, The Hague: Demographic Unit, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia, 15 September 2003.
[vi] Tabeau and Bijak, Casualties.
[vii] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Chamber, 24 March 2016, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf.
[ix] UN, ‘MONUC Mandate – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 2005. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/mandate.shtml
[x] UN, ‘MONUSCO Mandate – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml
[xi] UN, ‘MONUSCO Mandate – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml
[xii] UNMIL, ‘Mandate’, 2017. https://unmil.unmissions.org/mandate
[xiii] UNMIL, ‘Background’, 2017. https://unmil.unmissions.org/background
[xiv] David C. Becker, ‘Gangs, Netwar, and “Community Counterinsurgency” in Haiti’. Prism, 2011, p.137. http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-3/Prism_137-154_Becker.pdf
[xv] James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or Allies, London: Routledge, 2011, pp.120-121; David C. Becker, ‘Gangs, Netwar, and “Community Counterinsurgency” in Haiti’.
[xvi] Cockayne and Lupel, Peace Operations and Organised Crime, pp.120-121.
[xvii] International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition’, International Crisis Group: Latin America/Caribbean Report, 2012. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/044-towards-a-post-minustah-haiti-making-an-effective-transition.pdf
[xviii] International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition’
[xix] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building in Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo by United Nations Police in MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO: IED-16-014, p.14, Office of Internal Oversight Services: New York, 2016.
[xx] ICP Exclusive: Cote d’Ivoire Mission Sold Jobs in Herve Ladsous’ MONUSCO and MINUSTAH, 2017. https://www.scribd.com/doc/255048246/ICP-Exclusive-Cote-d-Ivoire-Mission-Sold-Jobs-in-Herve-Ladsous-MONUSCO-and-MINUSTAH
[xxi] ICP Exclusive: Cote d’Ivoire Mission Sold Jobs in Herve Ladsous’ MONUSCO and MINUSTAH.
[xxii] Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo, New York: Cornell University Press, 2016, p.9.
[xxiii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets,
[xxiv] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets
[xxv] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p. 78
[xxvi] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p. 46-47
[xxvii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.70
[xxviii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.45.
[xxix] Michael A. Innes, Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2006, p.83.
[xxx] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, 140.
[xxxi] Cockayne and Lupel, Peace Operations and Organised Crime, p.39.
[xxxii] Roxane Escobales, ‘UN peacekeepers ‘traded gold and guns with Congolese rebels’, The Guardian, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/28/congo.unitednations
[xxxiii] Roxane Escobales, ‘UN peacekeepers ‘traded gold and guns with Congolese rebels’
[xxxiv]Martin Plaut, ‘UN troops ‘traded gold for guns’, BBC, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6681457.stm
[xxxv] BBC UK, ‘UN troops ‘armed DR Congo rebels’, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7365283.stm
[xxxvii] van Woudenberg, ‘The Curse of Gold’.
[xxxviii] Colum Lynch, ‘U.N. Finds Fraud, Mismanagement in Peacekeeping’, The Washington Post, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121701914.html
[xxxix] UN, Internal Audit Division: Audit of Fuel Management in the United Nations Mission in Liberia Report 2017/048. Office of Internal Oversight Services: New York, 2017, p.3.
[xl] Audit of Fuel Management in MINUSTAH. ‘Audit Report’, Assignment No. AP2008/683/O6, 2009, p.2. https://usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/140735.pdf
[xli] Audit of Fuel Management in MINUSTAH, p.4.
[xlii] Owen Bowcott, ‘Report reveals shame of UN peacekeepers’, The Guardian, 2005. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/25/unitednations
[xliii] Reliefweb, Fifty-ninth session: Agenda item 77: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 2005. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/421DA870DF78A2BCC1256FDA0041E979-Zeid%20report%20_A-59-710_%20English.pdf
[xliv] UN, Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Internal Oversight Services: New York, 2016, p.9.
[xlv] Bernd Beber, Michael Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim, ‘U.N. peacekeeping and transactional sex’, The Washington Post, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/16/u-n-peacekeeping-and-transactional-sex/?utm_term=.3fad99512541
[xlvi] Beber et al, ‘U.N. peacekeeping and transactional sex’.
[xlvii] France 24, ‘UN peacekeepers ‘traded food and medicine for sex’, report reveals’, 2015. http://www.france24.com/en/20150611-un-peacekeepers-trade-food-medicine-sex-abuse-report-haiti-liberia
[xlviii] Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, U.N. Peacekeepers Ran a Child Sex Ring in Haiti, Foreign Policy, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/14/u-n-peacekeepers-ran-a-child-sex-ring-in-haiti/
[xlix] Dan Beeton, ‘Soldiers Without a Cause: Why Are Thousands of UN Troops Still in Haiti?’, CEPR, 2012. http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/soldiers-without-a-cause-why-are-thousands-of-un-troops-still-in-haiti
[l] Michelle Nichols, ‘U.S. envoy says U.N. aiding ‘corrupt’ Congo government’, Reuters, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-security-usa/u-s-envoy-says-u-n-aiding-corrupt-congo-government-idUSKBN1701QG.; Transparency International, Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 2013. https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_Profile_DRC_2014.pdf
[li] Luke Fenwick, ‘Counter-Corruption Reforms in Post Conflict Countries: Metrics, Indicators and Impact in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia’ Transparency International UK, 2011. http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2011-10_CounterCorruptionReforms_PostConflict.pdf
[lii] VOA, ‘Liberia Leader Acknowledges Failure in Anti-corruption Fight’, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/liberia-leader-acknowledges-failure-anti-corruption-fight/3690703.html
[liii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.44.
[lv] Marcus Tanner, ‘UN agreement reopens relief route to Sarajevo,’ Independent, 19 October 1992. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/un-agreement-reopens-relief-route-to-sarajevo-1558260.html.
[lvi] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.45
[lvii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.57
[lviii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.44-45
[lix] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, 2016, p.44
[lx] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.44
[lxi] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.143
[lxii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.24
[lxiii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p. 43
[lxiv] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p. 96
[lxv] Michael Pugh, ‘Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace’, Global Governance, 2002, Vol. 8 No. 4. p.151; Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo, p.119.
[lxvi] Denis Dzidic, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina hit by wave of violent protests’, The Guardian, 7 February 2014.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/07/bosnia-herzegovina-wave-violent-protests.
[lxvii] Pugh, ‘Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace’, p.171.
[lxviii] M. H. A. Menodii, ‘Problematic Peacekeeping in the DRC: From MONUC to MONUSCO’, Globalpolicy.org, 2013. https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/democratic-republic-of-congo/52244-problematic-peacekeeping-in-the-drc-from-monuc-to-monusco.html
[lxix] Zahra Moloo, ‘UN peacekeepers in the DRC no longer trusted to protect’, Aljazeera, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/01/peacekeepers-drc-longer-trusted-protect-160112081436110.html
[lxx] Moloo, ‘UN peacekeepers in the DRC no longer trusted to protect’.
[lxxi] van Woudenberg, ‘The Curse of Gold’.
[lxxii] Human Rights Watch, ‘Youth, Blood and Poverty: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’s Regional Warriors: VII. Problems in the Disarmament Programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia [1998-2005]’, 2005. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/westafrica0405/7.htm
[lxxiii] Plaut, ‘UN troops ‘traded gold for guns’
[lxxiv] Plaut, ‘UN troops ‘traded gold for guns’
[lxxv] Leonard Doyle, ‘Corruption inquiry by UN likely to stay secret: Allegations of war profiteering by peace-keepers investigated – Mostar Muslims try to hold aid convoy hostage as protection’, Independent, 27 August 1993. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/corruption-inquiry-by-un-likely-to-stay-secret-allegations-of-war-profiteering-by-peace-keepers-1463624.html.
[lxxvi] Colum Lynch, ‘Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission’, The Washington Post, 29 May 2001. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/05/29/misconduct-corruption-by-us-police-mar-bosnia-mission/c9609495-0321-4dc2-a7ae-7192eadc4616/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5205d909d349
[lxxvii] Transparency International Defence & Security, ‘Corruption & Peace Operations: Risks and Recommendations for Troop Contributing Countries and the United Nations’, 2016. http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/160330CorruptionRiskTCCsTIIDSPFIN.pdf
[lxxviii] UN, Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, p.19.
[lxxix] UN, Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, p.21-22.
[lxxx] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building in Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo by United Nations Police in MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO: IED-16-014, p.14. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-new-law-boon-police-reform
[lxxxi] Kenneth Roth and Steve Crawshaw, ‘UN: Hold Peacekeepers Accountable for Congo Smuggling’, Human Rights Watch, 2007. https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/23/un-hold-peacekeepers-accountable-congo-smuggling
[lxxxii] Doyle, ‘Corruption inquiry by UN likely to stay secret’.
[lxxxiii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo, p.48.
[lxxxiv] Roth and Crawshaw, ‘UN: Hold Peacekeepers Accountable for Congo Smuggling’; Plaut, ‘UN troops ‘traded gold for guns’.
[lxxxv] Audit of Fuel Management in MINUSTAH. ‘Audit Report’, Assignment No. AP2008/683/O6, 2009, available at: https://usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/140735.pdf [Accessed 23 Oct. 2017]. p.2.
[lxxxvi] Audit of Fuel Management in MINUSTAH, p.41.
[lxxxvii] International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition’, p.12.
[lxxxviii] International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,’ p.21-22.
[xc] Cutts, The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, p. 24
[xci] Cutts, The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, p.7.
[xcii] UN, Internal Audit Division: Audit of Fuel Management in the United Nations Mission in Liberia Report 2017/048. p.3.
[xciii]DFID, ‘Evidence Synthesis: Security Sector Reform and Organisational Capacity Building’. Assets. Publishing.Services.gov. 2015, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57bc170140f0b61272000010/Security-sector-reform-organisational-capacity-building.pdf p.21.
[xciv] Quoted in Charles T. Call and William D. Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices after Civil War.” Global Governance 7:2 (Apr-Jun 2001).
[xcv] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building, p.27-28.
[xcvi] Valerie Brender, ‘No Money, No Justice’, Human Rights Watch, 2013, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/08/22/no-money-no-justice/police-corruption-and-abuse-liberia [Accessed 23 Oct. 2017].
[xcvii] James Cockayne, ‘Winning Haiti’s Protection Competition: Organized Crime and Peace Operations Past, Present and Future’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, Iss.1, 26 January 2009.
[xcviii] Cockayne and Lupel, Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or Allies? p.121
[xcix] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building, p.14.
[c] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building, p.121.
[ci] International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition’, p.2.
[cii]International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition’, p.7.
[ciii] John Pike, ‘Haiti – Corruption’, Global Security, 2017. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/corruption.htm
[civ]OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building, p.21.
[cv] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building, p.21.
[cvi] OIOS, Evaluation of the Results of National Police Capacity-Building, p. 21
[cvii] William Clowes, ‘Smoke Bombs and Mirrors’, Slate, 11 March 2016. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/03/is-congos-brutal-national-police-force-showing-signs-of-reform.html; The Economist, ‘Kinshasa’s traffic police make 80% of their income “informally”’, The Economist, 18 September 2018.https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/09/08/kinshasas-traffic-police-make-80-of-their-income-informally; International Police Science Association, World Internal Security and Police Index, 2016. http://www.ipsa-police.org/images/uploaded/Pdf%20file/WISPI%20Report.pdf.
[cviii] Brender, ‘No Money, No Justice’
[cix] UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 2 December 2002, S/2002/1314 available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/mountolympus/Final%20UNSG%20report%20on%20UNMIBH.pdf.
[cx] UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.
[cxi] UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.
[cxii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.129.
[cxiii] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets
[cxiv] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets p.130.
[cxv] Lynch, ‘Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission’.
[cxvi] Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, p.132.
[cxvii] Lynch, ‘Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission’.
[cxviii] United Nations, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 June 2015, New York: United Nations, p.54.
[cxix] United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 18 January 2008, New York: United Nations.
[cxx]United Nations, Planning Toolkit, 30 June 2012, New York: United Nations, p.4.
[cxxi] United Nations, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, August 2012 New York: United Nations, Vol. 1 and 2
[cxxii] Cockayne and Lupel, Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or Allies? p.121.
[cxxiii] Transparency International Defence & Security, ‘Corruption & Peace Operations’, 2016. http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/160330CorruptionRiskTCCsTIIDSPFIN.pdf