Relations with host nation stakeholders
Sample storyline 1
Following prolonged conflict in the host nation, a military peace enforcement mission is deployed with a very short lead-in time, limited intelligence on the situation on the ground, and a ‘small footprint’ design. Mission leadership has therefore come to rely on a particular local leader for information on local context, intelligence on opposing forces and peace spoilers, and sustainment contracts from food to base construction material.
But increasingly, intelligence and operational reports indicate that the local leader’s information does not lead to capture of opponent operatives or disruption of their supply lines; rather, it appears to lead international forces to fight the leader’s opponents in the area. J9 reporting also suggests growing resentment toward the local leader from the population, with stories of extortion and abuse by his forces and demands of bribes for access to mission contracts. The local leader is also implicated in illegal drug trade.
Sample storyline 2
An international operation in defence of an ally under attack becomes aware that crucial operational intelligence appears to be leaking to opposing forces. Host nation counter-intelligence indicates that a senior official at the Ministry of Defence maintains links with individuals thought to be operatives of the opposing power. The official’s political biography includes stints controlling the country’s state-owned gas supply company, mired in allegations of international corruption for a decade prior to the conflict.
Implications for mission
- Operational design and force protection at risk due to inaccurate and insecure intelligence information;
- Undermining of the mission’s long-term goals related to preserving peace and improving security and governance.
Training audiences and objectives
- Identifying and reporting indicators and warnings of corruption, including the formation of criminal patronage networks (J2, J5, J9);
- Understanding long-term risks to mission goals (J5);
- Planning and implementing mitigation measures, including those that need to be coordinated by higher/lower commands (Command Group, J5);
- Gathering and feeding in information from the external environment (J2, J9);
- Making connections to host nation and international anti-corruption organisations (J9, Command Group);
- Liaising with host nation authorities and troop contributing nations (LEGAD, J9, J5, Command Group);
- Identifying potential political links and impact of the issue (POLAD);
- Communicating any steps being taken to address the shortcomings (Public Affairs Office/StratCom/PsyOps).
Links to other Storylines
- Countering drug smuggling: resistance from a nominally friendly force thwarts an initiative;
- Kinetic operational plans derailed by false intelligence;
- Efforts to secure the ‘hearts & minds’ are ineffective as CIMIC reports indicate resentment of the force’s liaison with a particular local leader.
- Analysis of overall perceptions of corruption levels in the country, including data on corruption perception and quality of governance (Corruption Perceptions Index; Global Corruption Barometer; World Governance Index);
- Biographical information on local leaders, including their affiliations and networks.
These can be contained in country books, Intelligence fusion reports, crisis updates, and reports in STARTEX packages.
- Operational reports indicating unreliable intelligence and/or leaks to opposing forces;
- J9 reports suggesting abuse by the allied leader’s units;
- Sustainment reports indicating overcharging in contracts;
- Monitoring reports noting lapses in contract implementation;
- Reports on little to no competition in contract tenders;
- Intelligence/J9 reports suggesting that local sustainment contractors are dominated by one ethnic group, tribe, or patronage networks;
- Intelligence reports of contacts between host nation officials and officials from the opposing power, including money changing hands;
- Media/NGO reports on unexplained wealth among officials.