3.6 Preparing tactical guidance and standard operating procedures
Many military organisations are much better equipped to conduct kinetic activity than they are to gather information enabling them to diagnose and mitigate corruption risks. Better preparedness is likely to require changes in standard operating procedures and instructions that could shape both mission planning and troop behaviour on the ground. These would likely need to include:
- Guidance on information gathering and evidence preservation: Sensitive Site Exploitation and forensic awareness, i.e. direction to gather and preserve evidence, such as computers and paperwork, that could help identify connections between individuals and networks;
- Guidance on links between corruption and insecurity;
- Guidance on the impact of corruption on security (force) assistance programmes;
- Guidance on operational sustainment and its impact on corrupt practices;
- Tactical-level guidance on protecting whistleblowers and responding to instances of corruption when deployed;
- Where security (force) assistance is part of the mission, development of the Host Nation’s capacity to adopt guidance, doctrine and operating procedures that can support anti-corruption analysis and activity.
For best results, these operational measures should be buttressed by long-term steps aimed at introducing corruption as a topic relevant to military offices. Three such steps would be particularly useful:
- Introduction of military doctrine that tackles the impact of corruption on military operations (for an example, see the UK Joint Doctrine Publication – 05), helping planning staffs approach the issue;
- Regular, systematic officer and NCO education on links between corruption and insecurity, to ensure a base level of competence;
- Introduction of standard operating procedures and instructions that would incorporate corruption issues into a headquarters’ planning process and battle rhythm.
- Command Group
- Others responsible for long-term planning and education