3.1 Resource diversion and corruption in the acquisition process
Corruption related to materiel, be that in procurement, logistics, or asset management and disposal, is one of the most frequent forms of illicit activity in the armed forces.
Risk Areas
3.1 Resource diversion and corruption in the acquisition process
Explanation of risk area
Corruption related to materiel, be that in procurement, logistics, or asset management and disposal, is one of the most frequent forms of illicit activity in the armed forces. At the tactical level, even low-ranking officers or privates can benefit from diverting and selling equipment, fuel or food rations. At operational and strategic levels, large amounts of money involved and processes that are often opaque create incentives and opportunities for manipulating tender processes and equipment specifications, demanding kickbacks, and funnelling money to corrupt networks through purchases that only happen on paper. But whatever the level and type of corruption, the overall effect is a weaker, badly equipped force and a significant waste of money.
Consequences for the mission
Waste of resources
Ineffective resource allocation
Inadvertent strengthening of adversaries who have access to mission and host nation resources
Examples
Case Study: Making the system work: security assistance to Ukraine, 2014-2017
Resource diversion in Ukraine
Following the outbreak of separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, donor states (including Canada, the US, the UK, Poland and Lithuania) provided equipment, clothing, and medical supplies – later extending to defensive weapons and enablers such as night-vision goggles – to Ukrainian armed forces. Widespread corruption in Ukraine’s military, however, meant that some donors resorted to working with volunteer groups, which ended up supplanting the army’s logistics branch.
View case studyCase Study: Corruption and Plan Colombia: The Missing Link
Plan Colombia and opportunities for diversion
Plan Colombia, a comprehensive US-run assistance plan for the Colombian armed forces, was accompanied by a significant rise in Colombia’s defence budget. The latter appears to have provided additional opportunity for diversion of resources through the procurement process – primarily kickbacks related to the awarding of contracts at the lower level, for example those related to unit –level supplies such as food. As recently as December 2017, Semana magazine reported that there had been significant diversions of confidential expenses by military personnel, with an internal MOD investigation finding that some 1 billion pesos (£260,000) had been stolen every two months.
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Procurement corruption in Nigeria's military
In Nigeria, former military chiefs have been accused of having stolen as much as US$15 billion through fraudulent arms and equipment procurement deals.
View external case studyCase Study: Afghanistan: Corruption and the making of warlords
Weapons and fuel diversion in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, some estimates put the number of soldiers who have at some point sold their weapons or ammunition for personal gain – including, in some cases, selling them to insurgent groups – at 80%. Similar numbers have been reported for the ANP, with commanders allegedly selling heavy vehicles and ammunition to the highest bidder. Fuel – a key resource – was frequently left unaccounted for and unmonitored, enabling fuel theft schemes such as that in the Kapisa province: Brigadier General Abdul Karim Fayeq, the provincial chief of police masterminded a scheme that diverted 60,000 gallons of fuel meant for ANA units.
View case studyIndicators & Warnings
Inability to account for weapons and other items
Donated equipment for sale on the black market or online
Donor or host nation equipment in the adversary's hands
Reports of inadequate resource distribution
Low levels of ammunition and other resources, especially for frontline troops
Repeated requests for assistance, often regarding the same items
Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
3.2 Bribery and patronage in recruitment and promotions
Both bribery and patronage in recruitment distort a meritocratic process meant to put the best people in particular posts.
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3.3 Misuse of defence funds: secret expenses
A significant risk can come with any discretionary expenditure that occurs in secret and has little to no oversight. These budget lines are vulnerable to diversion and misuse for private gain.
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3.4 Ghost soldiers
Absence of personnel and inaccurate data waste resources, impede operational planning and execution, and can lead to operational failures.
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3.5 Abuse of civilian populations
Whether subject to extortion or in danger of physical harm, the civilian population begins to see the armed forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
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3.6 Links with criminal, paramilitary and insurgent groups
Where armed forces support or lead operations against criminal and insurgent groups, infiltration by said groups – especially when their resources exceed those of particular units – is a very real risk.
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3.7 Provision of healthcare
The complexity of healthcare-related issues, the power imbalance between practitioner and patient, and the multitude of stakeholders involved are only some of the factors that make healthcare susceptible to corruption risks.
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3.8 Involvement in the country’s economy and politics
With preferential access to state resources – from budgets to communications networks to transportation corridors – and an ability to secure incentives such as tax breaks or conscript labour, armed forces which turn to economic activity enjoy an unfair advantage over civilian actors.
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Mitigations within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
1. Getting your own house in order: anti-corruption for mission forces
1.2 Codification and dissemination of ethical standards
1.3 Pre-deployment training and preparation
1.4 Whistleblowing and reporting channels
Strong integrity standards among mission troops and their ability to notice and report corruption can help identify corruption problems among partner forces.
When corruption occurs due to lack of resources or inability to meet basic needs, providing assistance can help change incentives and rationales.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
6. Utilising a comprehensive approach: supporting inter-agency initiatives & shaping incentives
6.1 Supporting civilian initiatives
6.2 Shaping incentives and limiting opportunities: a full spectrum
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create accountability for the defence and security forces, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
7. Working with civil society: from political inclusion to tactical cooperation
7.1 Formulating political strategies
7.2 Tactical cooperation: project oversight
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks. Their participation is also key to establishing healthy civil-military relations.
8. Reforming Host Nation Defence and Security Forces (HNDSF)
8.1 Supporting security sector reform (SSR)
8.2 Host nation training, partnering and mentoring
8.3 Countering personnel corruption: recruitment, promotions and payroll
8.4 Modernising acquisition processes and resource management systems
These are specific measures targeted at improving the integrity and effectiveness of defence and security forces. Their utility depends on the type of corrupt practices affecting a particular force.
9. Investing in monitoring and oversight
9.1 Overseeing donor funds: Inspector General systems
9.2 Overseeing donor funds: End-use monitoring of equipment
9.3 Strengthening host nation oversight
9.4 Supporting external oversight bodies
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.