3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)

At operational and tactical levels, corruption in defence and security forces can be a consequence of greed or of need. Where the forces struggle with under-resourcing, lack of pay, or lack of ability to deliver on their mission and to protect themselves, corruption can become a way to protect themselves. Similarly, in vertically integrated corrupt systems, corruption can be the only way to secure jobs or to be able to cover basic needs when pay it not coming through. Corruption thus often results in more corruption, as skimming from soldiers’ pay at a higher level (itself a corrupt practice) can result in checkpoint corruption or other abuses at the lower level.

In some cases, the effects of corruption are immediately visible, with predatory security forces abusing the populations they were set up to protect. In other cases, the secretive nature of the sector hides the effects of corruption until a crisis reveals them. In either case, when military structures have been damaged by corruption, they are incapable of responding to insecurity and violence. When a military fails, it fails spectacularly: predatory, hollowed-out forces create the space for the likes of Boko Haram, ISIS, and organised crime groups to thrive.

Where a mission involves partnering with or training and equipping host nation forces, corruption in their ranks can waste resources, strengthen criminal networks, compromise operational security and endanger the lives of HNSF and international troops. Pervasive corruption and abuse of power has the potential to undermine the entire mission or to subvert its resources to strengthen malign networks. Widespread corruption in defence and security forces can also make the mission’s exit strategy impossible or very difficult to implement.

But widespread corruption and weak institutional governance made the ANDSF untrustworthy and ineffective. Polling carried out in 2017, for example, showed that Afghans feared for their personal safety when coming across Afghan National Police (ANP) or Afghan National Army (ANA) officers: nationally, 43% were wary of encountering the ANP and 40% of the ANA, with over 60% in the south-western region of the country declaring mistrust.

“Corruption by ANDSF officials, at all institutional levels, has degraded security, force readiness, and overall capabilities. High-level corruption, such as that exhibited by some ANDSF leaders, is likely to promote lower-level corruption, as a culture of impunity starts at the top and then normalizes corrupt behavior within the entire system. It gives the rank and file an ‘excuse’ to engage in extortion, embezzlement, fraud, and other abusive behaviors themselves, which then directly affects the population.”

SIGAR, Reconstructing the ANDSF, p. 60

Corruption is likely to affect not only the host nation armed forces, but also – if not primarily – the police, customs agents and border guards. Proceeds from controlling border crossings, smuggling routes, ports, and airports can be a significant revenue stream, helping powerbrokers, insurgents, terrorist organisations and organised crime groups to finance their operations. Corruption among border staff is an enabler of larger corrupt schemes: revenues can be garnered from looking the other way as smuggling occurs, such as allowing consumer goods in without paying the requisite tariffs or waving through shipment of illicit goods. Even more lucrative is the explicit involvement of the customs and border authorities in smuggling, especially moving contraband or selling information to smugglers. A corrupt border security force allows transnational criminal activity to function efficiently, enables insurgent and other forces to bring in weapons, improvised explosive devices, and manpower across borders.