3.1 Resource diversion and corruption in the acquisition process
Corruption related to materiel, be that in procurement, logistics, or asset management and disposal, is one of the most frequent forms of illicit activity in the armed forces.
Risk Areas
3.2 Bribery and patronage in recruitment and promotions
Explanation of risk area
Both bribery and patronage in recruitment – be that bribes for being assigned to particular units or bribes to avoid conscription, or promotions reserved for members of one ethnic group – distort a meritocratic process meant to put the best people in particular posts. This means that unqualified personnel might be promoted, while those who would do a better job languish on the sidelines. When access to cash begins to determine who ends up on the frontlines, morale, esprit de corps, and the overall ability of the force to provide security all suffer.
Corruption can also be a means to helping criminal patronage networks co-opt defence and security forces by placing their affiliates in important posts, and to subvert the purpose of the forces, pulling them away from protecting the population and toward fighting for particularistic network interests.
Consequences for the mission
Inability to plan operations effectively as real competences and commitment do not match the picture that is on paper
Low morale in partner forces
Diversion and waste of resources
Low effectiveness of training and education for partner forces
Examples
External Link
Avoiding conscription through bribery: Ukraine
In Ukraine, widespread bribery to avoid conscription during the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk resulted in diversion of resources, inadequate strength of the army, and inequality in how citizens were treated: those who could afford to avoid military service, did, while others found themselves at the front line, often without appropriate life-saving equipment.
View external case studyExternal Link
Patronage in recruitment and promotions: Mali
In Mali, patronage in recruitment and promotions meant that those linked to the President would be placed in better-trained and better-equipped units; others made it to units which were sent to manage the precarious security situation in the north of the country, frequently without appropriate training or equipment. This discrepancy in allocation of resources, coupled with patronage in unit assignations, resulted in widespread discontent and in the long term, contributed to an armed coup.
View external case studyIndicators & Warnings
Lack of clear criteria for recruitment and promotions
Opaque and unaccountable organisational structures
Discretionary influence of individuals on promotion - no independent promotion boards
High-ranking officers unwilling or unable to do their jobs
Multiple members of the same network - family, tribe, ethnic, social or economic group - in positions of power
The same personnel members on multiple donor-sponsored courses
Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
3.2 Bribery and patronage in recruitment and promotions
Both bribery and patronage in recruitment distort a meritocratic process meant to put the best people in particular posts.
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3.3 Misuse of defence funds: secret expenses
A significant risk can come with any discretionary expenditure that occurs in secret and has little to no oversight. These budget lines are vulnerable to diversion and misuse for private gain.
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3.4 Ghost soldiers
Absence of personnel and inaccurate data waste resources, impede operational planning and execution, and can lead to operational failures.
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3.5 Abuse of civilian populations
Whether subject to extortion or in danger of physical harm, the civilian population begins to see the armed forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
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3.6 Links with criminal, paramilitary and insurgent groups
Where armed forces support or lead operations against criminal and insurgent groups, infiltration by said groups – especially when their resources exceed those of particular units – is a very real risk.
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3.7 Provision of healthcare
The complexity of healthcare-related issues, the power imbalance between practitioner and patient, and the multitude of stakeholders involved are only some of the factors that make healthcare susceptible to corruption risks.
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3.8 Involvement in the country’s economy and politics
With preferential access to state resources – from budgets to communications networks to transportation corridors – and an ability to secure incentives such as tax breaks or conscript labour, armed forces which turn to economic activity enjoy an unfair advantage over civilian actors.
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Mitigations within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
1. Getting your own house in order: anti-corruption for mission forces
1.2 Codification and dissemination of ethical standards
1.3 Pre-deployment training and preparation
1.4 Whistleblowing and reporting channels
Strong integrity standards among mission troops and their ability to notice and report corruption can help identify corruption problems among partner forces.
When corruption occurs due to lack of resources or inability to meet basic needs, providing assistance can help change incentives and rationales.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
6. Utilising a comprehensive approach: supporting inter-agency initiatives & shaping incentives
6.1 Supporting civilian initiatives
6.2 Shaping incentives and limiting opportunities: a full spectrum
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create accountability for the defence and security forces, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
7. Working with civil society: from political inclusion to tactical cooperation
7.1 Formulating political strategies
7.2 Tactical cooperation: project oversight
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks. Their participation is also key to establishing healthy civil-military relations.
8. Reforming Host Nation Defence and Security Forces (HNDSF)
8.1 Supporting security sector reform (SSR)
8.2 Host nation training, partnering and mentoring
8.3 Countering personnel corruption: recruitment, promotions and payroll
8.4 Modernising acquisition processes and resource management systems
These are specific measures targeted at improving the integrity and effectiveness of defence and security forces. Their utility depends on the type of corrupt practices affecting a particular force.
9. Investing in monitoring and oversight
9.1 Overseeing donor funds: Inspector General systems
9.2 Overseeing donor funds: End-use monitoring of equipment
9.3 Strengthening host nation oversight
9.4 Supporting external oversight bodies
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.