3.1 Resource diversion and corruption in the acquisition process
Corruption related to materiel, be that in procurement, logistics, or asset management and disposal, is one of the most frequent forms of illicit activity in the armed forces.
Risk Areas
3.4 Ghost soldiers
Explanation of risk area
‘Ghost soldiers’ refer to non-existent troops added to personnel rosters by officials to pocket the salary allocated for these soldiers. In some cases, ghost soldiers persist because casualties are not removed from rosters; in others, the names are made up. In other contexts, the soldiers do in fact exist, but do not show up to train or fight. Their salary is then split between the soldier and the commanding officer hiding their absence. In both cases, absence of personnel and inaccurate data waste resources, impede operational planning and execution, and can lead to operational failures.
Consequences for the mission
Inability to plan operations effectively
Low morale
Diversion and waste of resources
Examples
External Link
Ghost soldiers and the fall of Mosul
During the 2014 battle of Mosul, ghost soldiers in the ranks of the Iraqi security forces rendered the efforts to defend the city ineffective. With units at a fraction of their nominal strength, the city fell to a numerically inferior ISIS force.
View external case studyCase Study: Afghanistan: Corruption and the making of warlords
Ghost soldiers in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, reports of police chiefs inflating personnel numbers to pocket salaries, as well as of army units whose actual strength could not be verified, have been noted at least since 2006. In 2006 and 2007, for example, field visits from US officers and provincial surveys confirmed the existence and presence of about 76% of the more than 45,000 police officers meant to be on duty. In October 2016, Taliban forces overran the Helmand town of Nawa, whose defences were found unexpectedly weak as more than half of the 700 policemen assigned to defend the district only existed on paper. A similar problem affected the ANA in Helmand: in 2016, a newly appointed commander found that out of 250 soldiers assigned to 10 checkpoints, only 96 were actually at their posts and out of those 96, only 54 had weapons.
View case studyIndicators & Warnings
Discrepancies between reported and actual personnel numbers
Shortages in personnel, for example in manning of checkpoints
Cash-based payment systems
Commanding officers responsible for disbursement of salaries
Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
3.2 Bribery and patronage in recruitment and promotions
Both bribery and patronage in recruitment distort a meritocratic process meant to put the best people in particular posts.
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3.3 Misuse of defence funds: secret expenses
A significant risk can come with any discretionary expenditure that occurs in secret and has little to no oversight. These budget lines are vulnerable to diversion and misuse for private gain.
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3.4 Ghost soldiers
Absence of personnel and inaccurate data waste resources, impede operational planning and execution, and can lead to operational failures.
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3.5 Abuse of civilian populations
Whether subject to extortion or in danger of physical harm, the civilian population begins to see the armed forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
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3.6 Links with criminal, paramilitary and insurgent groups
Where armed forces support or lead operations against criminal and insurgent groups, infiltration by said groups – especially when their resources exceed those of particular units – is a very real risk.
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3.7 Provision of healthcare
The complexity of healthcare-related issues, the power imbalance between practitioner and patient, and the multitude of stakeholders involved are only some of the factors that make healthcare susceptible to corruption risks.
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3.8 Involvement in the country’s economy and politics
With preferential access to state resources – from budgets to communications networks to transportation corridors – and an ability to secure incentives such as tax breaks or conscript labour, armed forces which turn to economic activity enjoy an unfair advantage over civilian actors.
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Mitigations within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
1. Getting your own house in order: anti-corruption for mission forces
1.2 Codification and dissemination of ethical standards
1.3 Pre-deployment training and preparation
1.4 Whistleblowing and reporting channels
Strong integrity standards among mission troops and their ability to notice and report corruption can help identify corruption problems among partner forces.
When corruption occurs due to lack of resources or inability to meet basic needs, providing assistance can help change incentives and rationales.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
6. Utilising a comprehensive approach: supporting inter-agency initiatives & shaping incentives
6.1 Supporting civilian initiatives
6.2 Shaping incentives and limiting opportunities: a full spectrum
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create accountability for the defence and security forces, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
7. Working with civil society: from political inclusion to tactical cooperation
7.1 Formulating political strategies
7.2 Tactical cooperation: project oversight
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks. Their participation is also key to establishing healthy civil-military relations.
8. Reforming Host Nation Defence and Security Forces (HNDSF)
8.1 Supporting security sector reform (SSR)
8.2 Host nation training, partnering and mentoring
8.3 Countering personnel corruption: recruitment, promotions and payroll
8.4 Modernising acquisition processes and resource management systems
These are specific measures targeted at improving the integrity and effectiveness of defence and security forces. Their utility depends on the type of corrupt practices affecting a particular force.
9. Investing in monitoring and oversight
9.1 Overseeing donor funds: Inspector General systems
9.2 Overseeing donor funds: End-use monitoring of equipment
9.3 Strengthening host nation oversight
9.4 Supporting external oversight bodies
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.