3.1 Resource diversion and corruption in the acquisition process
Corruption related to materiel, be that in procurement, logistics, or asset management and disposal, is one of the most frequent forms of illicit activity in the armed forces.
Risk Areas
3.5 Abuse of civilian populations
Explanation of risk area
Where armed forces are pushed to corruption, either due to greed or because of need (for example, due to unpaid salaries), the consequences are frequently felt by the civilian population. Whether subject to extortion or in danger of physical harm, the civilian population begins to see the armed forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. As civil-military relations break down, the military’s ability to provide security for the population ebbs away; the flow of information needed for operational effectiveness and minimisation of casualties is interrupted; there is a growing disconnect between civilians and military personnel; and armed forces’ legitimacy and effectiveness suffer. It also becomes more difficult for donors to help create effective institutions.
Consequences for the mission
Fraught civil-military relations
Difficult reconciliation and peace processes: in Colombia, some human rights groups oppose the inclusion of those responsible for extrajudicial killings in transitional justice arrangements, arguing that these should be treated not as a political crime, but rather one committed for private gain. This complicates the reconciliation processStunted economic development due to widespread bribery
Examples
Case Study: Corruption and Plan Colombia: The Missing Link
False positives in Colombia
During Plan Colombia, the phenomenon of ‘false positives’ – the extrajudicial killing of civilians by soldiers or by criminals they hired in order to present their bodies as guerrillas or criminals killed in combat – was the most significant form of abuse toward the civilian population. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions found that the killings were committed across the country, and by a large number of different military units. The phenomenon of false positives is widely linked to the pressure the Uribe government placed on the Colombian military to achieve results, often combined with search for private gain: soldiers who could show results – measured in body counts – would be rewarded with promotions, cash, and overseas trips.
View case studyCase Study: Afghanistan: Corruption and the making of warlords
Illegal checkpoints in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, abuses perpetrated by the security forces directly on the civilian population have ranged from establishment of illegal checkpoints to extorting bribes for unlawful, arbitrary arrests and detentions. A 2013 report identifies bribes extorted at illegal checkpoints set up by the ANP as one of the main grievances of long-haul truck drivers, often abused and humiliated as police officers sought to break their resistance. The problem was widespread: about 59% of police checkpoints in the country were found to have been collecting illegal tolls.
View case studyExternal Link
Abuse of civilians in DRC
In the DRC, abuse by unpaid troops has led the population in conflict-affected provinces to perceive the DRC armed forces as a threat rather than a source of security.
View external case studyIndicators & Warnings
Reports of abuse from civil society or in intelligence reports
Adversary casualty reports do not match physical evidence; for example, the suspected opponents' age or physical fitness makes them unlikely to be combatants
Adversary casualty reports to not match operational reports of unit activity
Low salaries for military personnel
Unexplained wealth among military personnel
Demands for fees at checkpoints without appropriate receipts or tariffs
Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
3.2 Bribery and patronage in recruitment and promotions
Both bribery and patronage in recruitment distort a meritocratic process meant to put the best people in particular posts.
Explore Risk Area
3.3 Misuse of defence funds: secret expenses
A significant risk can come with any discretionary expenditure that occurs in secret and has little to no oversight. These budget lines are vulnerable to diversion and misuse for private gain.
Explore Risk Area
3.4 Ghost soldiers
Absence of personnel and inaccurate data waste resources, impede operational planning and execution, and can lead to operational failures.
Explore Risk Area
3.5 Abuse of civilian populations
Whether subject to extortion or in danger of physical harm, the civilian population begins to see the armed forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
Explore Risk Area
3.6 Links with criminal, paramilitary and insurgent groups
Where armed forces support or lead operations against criminal and insurgent groups, infiltration by said groups – especially when their resources exceed those of particular units – is a very real risk.
Explore Risk Area
3.7 Provision of healthcare
The complexity of healthcare-related issues, the power imbalance between practitioner and patient, and the multitude of stakeholders involved are only some of the factors that make healthcare susceptible to corruption risks.
Explore Risk Area
3.8 Involvement in the country’s economy and politics
With preferential access to state resources – from budgets to communications networks to transportation corridors – and an ability to secure incentives such as tax breaks or conscript labour, armed forces which turn to economic activity enjoy an unfair advantage over civilian actors.
Explore Risk Area
Mitigations within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
1. Getting your own house in order: anti-corruption for mission forces
1.2 Codification and dissemination of ethical standards
1.3 Pre-deployment training and preparation
1.4 Whistleblowing and reporting channels
Strong integrity standards among mission troops and their ability to notice and report corruption can help identify corruption problems among partner forces.
When corruption occurs due to lack of resources or inability to meet basic needs, providing assistance can help change incentives and rationales.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
6. Utilising a comprehensive approach: supporting inter-agency initiatives & shaping incentives
6.1 Supporting civilian initiatives
6.2 Shaping incentives and limiting opportunities: a full spectrum
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create accountability for the defence and security forces, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
7. Working with civil society: from political inclusion to tactical cooperation
7.1 Formulating political strategies
7.2 Tactical cooperation: project oversight
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks. Their participation is also key to establishing healthy civil-military relations.
8. Reforming Host Nation Defence and Security Forces (HNDSF)
8.1 Supporting security sector reform (SSR)
8.2 Host nation training, partnering and mentoring
8.3 Countering personnel corruption: recruitment, promotions and payroll
8.4 Modernising acquisition processes and resource management systems
These are specific measures targeted at improving the integrity and effectiveness of defence and security forces. Their utility depends on the type of corrupt practices affecting a particular force.
9. Investing in monitoring and oversight
9.1 Overseeing donor funds: Inspector General systems
9.2 Overseeing donor funds: End-use monitoring of equipment
9.3 Strengthening host nation oversight
9.4 Supporting external oversight bodies
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.