3.1 Resource diversion and corruption in the acquisition process
Corruption related to materiel, be that in procurement, logistics, or asset management and disposal, is one of the most frequent forms of illicit activity in the armed forces.
Risk Areas
3.6 Links with criminal, paramilitary and insurgent groups
Explanation of risk area
Where armed forces support or lead operations against criminal and insurgent groups, infiltration by said groups – especially when their resources exceed those of particular units – is a very real risk. That infiltration can take the shape of members of the security forces being bribed or invited to partake in illegally obtained gains in exchange for not making arrests, passing on sensitive information, or protecting illegal activities.
Consequences for the mission
Weakening of the HNDSF and their unsuitability as a reliable partner
Strengthening of adversary groups
Threats to civilians
Increasing levels of violence and insecurity
Diversion of resources
Weakened force protection
Examples
Case Study: Corruption and Plan Colombia: The Missing Link
Colombian security forces and narco-infiltration
In Colombia in the 1990s and 2000s, the huge profits offered by the drug trade presented a serious corruption risk for members of the security forces, especially those deployed in front-line positions and remote from centres of support. Police officers would transport chemicals needed to make drugs; air force planes were allegedly used to transport cocaine; naval officers would pass on information about patrols to traffickers; and some army units would protect drug factories from patrols and facilitated the smuggling of fuel to drug smugglers. A case of narco-infiltration that drew particular attention in the US was the 2006 killing of 10 elite US-trained counternarcotics police and an informant in the region of Jamundí, in west Colombia. They had been ambushed and gunned down by an army unit, which was apparently in the pay of a criminal group. Notably, in some cases these relationships were motivated not by greed, but by need: with limited resources and little political support, armed forces often lacked the ability to mount effective operations and to protect themselves.
View case studyIndicators & Warnings
Adversary groups enjoying freedom of movement in certain areas and/or evading capture
Evidence of contraband smuggling, including cross-border
Criminal groups' access to small arms, some of which could be tracked to security forces
HNDSF undertaking unscheduled and unreported flights and movements
Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
3.2 Bribery and patronage in recruitment and promotions
Both bribery and patronage in recruitment distort a meritocratic process meant to put the best people in particular posts.
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3.3 Misuse of defence funds: secret expenses
A significant risk can come with any discretionary expenditure that occurs in secret and has little to no oversight. These budget lines are vulnerable to diversion and misuse for private gain.
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3.4 Ghost soldiers
Absence of personnel and inaccurate data waste resources, impede operational planning and execution, and can lead to operational failures.
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3.5 Abuse of civilian populations
Whether subject to extortion or in danger of physical harm, the civilian population begins to see the armed forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
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3.6 Links with criminal, paramilitary and insurgent groups
Where armed forces support or lead operations against criminal and insurgent groups, infiltration by said groups – especially when their resources exceed those of particular units – is a very real risk.
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3.7 Provision of healthcare
The complexity of healthcare-related issues, the power imbalance between practitioner and patient, and the multitude of stakeholders involved are only some of the factors that make healthcare susceptible to corruption risks.
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3.8 Involvement in the country’s economy and politics
With preferential access to state resources – from budgets to communications networks to transportation corridors – and an ability to secure incentives such as tax breaks or conscript labour, armed forces which turn to economic activity enjoy an unfair advantage over civilian actors.
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Mitigations within Risk Pathway 3. Partnering with host nation defence and security forces (HNDSF)
1. Getting your own house in order: anti-corruption for mission forces
1.2 Codification and dissemination of ethical standards
1.3 Pre-deployment training and preparation
1.4 Whistleblowing and reporting channels
Strong integrity standards among mission troops and their ability to notice and report corruption can help identify corruption problems among partner forces.
When corruption occurs due to lack of resources or inability to meet basic needs, providing assistance can help change incentives and rationales.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
6. Utilising a comprehensive approach: supporting inter-agency initiatives & shaping incentives
6.1 Supporting civilian initiatives
6.2 Shaping incentives and limiting opportunities: a full spectrum
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create accountability for the defence and security forces, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
7. Working with civil society: from political inclusion to tactical cooperation
7.1 Formulating political strategies
7.2 Tactical cooperation: project oversight
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks. Their participation is also key to establishing healthy civil-military relations.
8. Reforming Host Nation Defence and Security Forces (HNDSF)
8.1 Supporting security sector reform (SSR)
8.2 Host nation training, partnering and mentoring
8.3 Countering personnel corruption: recruitment, promotions and payroll
8.4 Modernising acquisition processes and resource management systems
These are specific measures targeted at improving the integrity and effectiveness of defence and security forces. Their utility depends on the type of corrupt practices affecting a particular force.
9. Investing in monitoring and oversight
9.1 Overseeing donor funds: Inspector General systems
9.2 Overseeing donor funds: End-use monitoring of equipment
9.3 Strengthening host nation oversight
9.4 Supporting external oversight bodies
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.