2.1 State capture and criminal patronage networks
Military operations intervene with significant resources at their disposal. Such extensive resources can have unintended consequences if they are allowed to strengthen malign networks.
Risk Areas
An intervening force, especially a sizable one with significant resources at its disposal, can strengthen or weaken host nation stakeholders, depending on whether it decides to cooperate with them or to sideline them. Tangible and intangible resources – including political support and contracting relationships providing work and income for selected actors – can have unintended consequences if they are redirected to strengthen malign networks.
Weakening of legitimate governance structures
Increased strength and impact of criminal and corrupt networks
Difficulty in achieving development- and security-related goals due to spoiler activity
Increasing violence and insecurity levels
Increasing disenchantment among the host nation population
Adversaries using corruption as a way to discredit friendly government and/or in recruitmentDiminished force protection levels
Waste of resources
Making the achievement of mission end state and exit strategy much more difficult
In Iraq, a triangular relationship between criminal, terrorist and insurgent organisations, and the government led the Iraqi state to become an instrument for the elites to accumulate power and wealth. Parts of the Iraqi government were tied to various militia, most notably Shia-controlled military forces that became de facto government death squads as they profited from a range of criminal activities. This led to a vicious cycle where the lack of state legitimacy made partisan or sectarian affiliation even more important for an individual’s protection, which in turn further weakened the state.
View external case studyCase Study: Afghanistan: Corruption and the making of warlords
During the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, reliance on Afghan partners – from intelligence to provision of fighting forces – was, as the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has written, a logical consequence of US strategy of a light footprint and limited engagement. But close cooperation with militias, from the Northern Alliance to other actors in southern Afghanistan, meant that warlords responsible for human rights abuses and widespread corruption were able to occupy high political and social positions in Afghanistan. In 2002, 20 out of 32 freshly appointed Afghan provincial governors, were militia leaders and warlords. The 2005 parliamentary elections, supported by the international community, further empowered and legitimised former warlords and drug traffickers. These actors were then able to use their newly gained positions to build patronage networks, often vertically integrated, to monopolise access to resources, challenge the monopoly of the state on the use of force, and undermine long-term development goals.
View case studyAs the high hopes for political and economic change following the Arab Spring faded, international support helped legitimise one military regime whose impact on the country’s economy and political life turned out to be detrimental. In Egypt, as the armed forces took increasing control of economic enterprises and curtailed political freedom, they continued to receive in-kind assistance and political support from the international community. The US, for example, has viewed Egypt as a key partner in the region and shored it up in a quest to promote stability. However, with the Egyptian armed forces increasingly preoccupied with their economic empire and political control, it is less and less clear that they can provide a reliable and effective cooperation in tackling terrorism-related issues.
View external case studyThe Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has concluded that the Coalition Provisional Authority, responsible for security and reconstruction in post-Saddam Iraq, saw anti-fraud and anti-corruption controls as unnecessarily slowing down the operational effort. Officials attempted to circumvent risk mitigation measures by consciously breaking up contracts into smaller ones, to keep their size under that which would have warranted an audit. Fallout from poor procurement practices did not take long to make the mission more expensive and less capable of delivering what it set out to do.
View external case studyImpunity, often stemming from political interference in criminal investigations/refusal to prosecute those accused of corruption or other crimes. Even with overwhelming evidence, charges may be dropped, evidence lost, or judges bribed or coerced. Sentences may be inappropriately light or forms of escape, medical release, or house arrest may be offered in lieu of spending time in jail.
Credible and repeated allegations of officials’ involvement with smuggling rings and corrupt networks
‘Recycling’ of corrupt officials: those accused of gross injustice are moved to new jobs or fired, only to reappear a few months later in a different capacity
Multiple members of the same network – family, tribe, family, tribe, ethnic, social or economic group– in positions of power
Reports of monopolisation of an economic area or industry by a particular actor or network
A highly politicised civil service where hiring and promotion decisions are based on nepotism and patronage
Capture of defence and security forces by different factions, with a view to use soldiers to protect factional interests
Allegations of vote rigging and/or improper influence on elections
Government procurement awards to officials’ family members
Weak legal framework and limited criminalisation of corruption
Inadequate enforcement systems, including the police and judiciary
Resistance to judicial reform
Poor perception of government among host nation population
Low scores on corruption- and governance-related indices (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and Global Corruption Barometer; the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators)
Public perception polls indicating corruption as a key issue and/or high levels of bribery
Anti-corruption protests
Religious leaders and community organisations speaking out about corruption
Media reports and social media discussion of corruption
Repression of journalists, especially those investigating corruption
Suppression of civil society organisations, especially those working on anti-corruption issues. This can be done through laws that can cut off their freedom of manoeuvre and their resources, or through interference with their leadership.
Military operations intervene with significant resources at their disposal. Such extensive resources can have unintended consequences if they are allowed to strengthen malign networks.
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Working with the local community is a necessity for obtaining intelligence in the operational theatre, however there are significant risks for corruption involved in relying heavily on one or a few sources.
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Employment of private militia and security companies can have long term consequences as resources and support can enable them to comete with state structures.
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Privileged access and the mandate to control shipments are necessary for international missions to do their jobs; however, they can also create opportunities for corruption and abuse of entrusted position, often for private gain.
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The access that international missions have to basic resources such as food, water and medication has in the past opened door to sexual abuse. This involves an abuse of entrusted powers – distribution of resources and keeping of peace – for private gratification.
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Promoting strong integrity standards among mission personnel can help set expectations for relations with the host nation, and prevent creation of new opportunities for corrupt networks.
Supporting those who are willing to join legitimate, inclusive governance structures can help create an alternative to the power of corrupt networks.
Ensuring political support and resource flows to those with an interest in a peaceful, stable solution to the conflict.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create counter-balance to state capture, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks.
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.
Mitigate corruption risks in sustainment and contracting to limit the flow of resources to corrupt networks.