2.1 State capture and criminal patronage networks
Military operations intervene with significant resources at their disposal. Such extensive resources can have unintended consequences if they are allowed to strengthen malign networks.
Risk Areas
2.2 Intelligence dependence
Explanation of risk area
Reliance on and cooperation with local stakeholders is a necessary and usual way of obtaining intelligence and understanding the operational theatre. However, excessive reliance on one or very few sources of information can produce a skewed, inaccurate operational picture. It can also empower the source of the mission’s information, enabling them to use the mission’s action for their own ends and to use the position of trust for private or group gain. This is particularly dangerous if, apart from providing intelligence, local stakeholders also derive benefits from mission sustainment contracts or provide militia for base security.
Consequences for the mission
Unreliable operational information leading to ineffective operational design
Inadvertent targeting of friendly or neutral networks
Creating space for adversaries to regroup and strengthen
Growth of criminal patronage networks
Harm to civilian population
Examples
Case Study: Afghanistan: Corruption and the making of warlords
Gul Agha Sherzai and intelligence dependence in Afghanistan
In the Afghan province of Kandahar, Operation Enduring Freedom’s excessive reliance on information obtained from Governor Gul Agha Sherzai gave Sherzai the means to consolidate his economic and political position in the province. Having secured a privileged position as a supplier of materiel and labour to US forces at Kandahar Airfield, Sherzai offered desired intelligence on Taliban networks in order to preserve his position as the preferred ally – which in turn enabled him to build up his own political and economic reach. However, with Taliban networks at their lowest ebb in 2002-2003, the ‘intelligence’ often pointed to individuals with at best tenuous and at worst entirely unproven involvement with the insurgency. Simultaneously, militia connected to Sherzai and given free rein to operate across Kandahar province used their trusted position with OEF forces to threaten arbitrarily US arrests and profit from bribes for individuals’ release.
View case studyIndicators & Warnings
Information procured predominantly from one source
Little to no contact with the local population
A few selected actors acting as gatekeepers for others, creating an imbalance of power
Information not confirmed during operations
Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 2. Relations with host nation stakeholders
2.2 Intelligence dependence
Working with the local community is a necessity for obtaining intelligence in the operational theatre, however there are significant risks for corruption involved in relying heavily on one or a few sources.
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2.3 Support for private militia and security companies
Employment of private militia and security companies can have long term consequences as resources and support can enable them to comete with state structures.
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2.4 Mission involvement in illegal trade, including natural resources
Privileged access and the mandate to control shipments are necessary for international missions to do their jobs; however, they can also create opportunities for corruption and abuse of entrusted position, often for private gain.
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2.5 Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)
The access that international missions have to basic resources such as food, water and medication has in the past opened door to sexual abuse. This involves an abuse of entrusted powers – distribution of resources and keeping of peace – for private gratification.
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Mitigations within Risk Pathway 2. Relations with host nation stakeholders
1. Getting your own house in order: anti-corruption for mission forces
1.1 Mission personnel recruitment
1.2 Codification and dissemination of ethical standards
1.3 Pre-deployment training and preparation
1.4 Whistleblowing and reporting channels
1.5 Internal investigations and sanctions
Promoting strong integrity standards among mission personnel can help set expectations for relations with the host nation, and prevent creation of new opportunities for corrupt networks.
Supporting those who are willing to join legitimate, inclusive governance structures can help create an alternative to the power of corrupt networks.
Ensuring political support and resource flows to those with an interest in a peaceful, stable solution to the conflict.
Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.
6. Utilising a comprehensive approach: supporting inter-agency initiatives & shaping incentives
6.1 Supporting civilian initiatives
6.2 Shaping incentives and limiting opportunities: a full spectrum
Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create counter-balance to state capture, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
7. Working with civil society: from political inclusion to tactical cooperation
7.1 Formulating political strategies
7.2 Tactical cooperation: project oversight
Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks.
9. Investing in monitoring and oversight
9.1 Overseeing donor funds: Inspector General systems
9.2 Overseeing donor funds: End-use monitoring of equipment
9.3 Strengthening host nation oversight
9.4 Supporting external oversight bodies
Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.
Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.
11. Mitigating corruption in sustainment and contracting
11.1 Making sustainment and contracting ‘Commander’s business’
11.2 Ensuring appropriate levels of expertise among mission personnel
11.3 Promoting competition: disseminating information about tenders
11.4 Promoting competition: merit- and integrity-based requirements
11.5 Performing supply chain due diligence
11.6 Limited reliance on and control of subcontractors, agents and intermediaries
11.7 Training and awareness raising for contractors and subcontractors
11.8 Transparency in contracting
11.9 Contract oversight
11.10 Sanctioning contractors: suspension and debarment (S&D)
11.11 Tracking and monitoring for asset disposal
Mitigate corruption risks in sustainment and contracting to limit the flow of resources to corrupt networks.