Risk Areas

2.3 Support for private militia and security companies

Explanation of risk area

Employment of private militia and security companies – to provide base security, escort convoys, or cooperate in kinetic and intelligence operations – can have longer-term consequences. Resources and support flowing to private militia can enable them to compete with state structures for the monopoly in providing security and using force; the combination of dependence on militia and lack of oversight of their actions results in a culture of impunity allowing militia to abuse civilians and divert public resources for private gain.

Consequences for the mission

Breach of the state’s monopoly on the use of force

Diversion of resources from legitimate governance structures

Creation of parallel power structures which can feed corrupt networks

Alienation of host nation populations

Reputational risk

Making the achievement of mission end state and exit strategy much more difficult

Examples

Case Study: Afghanistan: Corruption and the making of warlords

Support for private militia in Afghanistan

Employment of and support for private militia in Afghanistan enabled the growth of a warlord class possessing the means and will to use force, and capable of diverting resources for their own gain. Private militia were also notorious for mistreating civilians, extorting bribes, carrying out violent assaults, trafficking drugs, kidnapping for ransom, and illegal arms trade. In the long term, it has led to widespread abuses, endangered governance and security, and tarnished the reputation of international forces by association.

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Indicators & Warnings

Reports of abuses, especially from civilians

Unreliable intelligence

Overbilling on services

Living beyond means

Risk Areas within Risk Pathway 2. Relations with host nation stakeholders

2.1 State capture and criminal patronage networks

Military operations intervene with significant resources at their disposal. Such extensive resources can have unintended consequences if they are allowed to strengthen malign networks.

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2.2 Intelligence dependence

Working with the local community is a necessity for obtaining intelligence in the operational theatre, however there are significant risks for corruption involved in relying heavily on one or a few sources.

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2.3 Support for private militia and security companies

Employment of private militia and security companies can have long term consequences as resources and support can enable them to comete with state structures.

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2.4 Mission involvement in illegal trade, including natural resources

Privileged access and the mandate to control shipments are necessary for international missions to do their jobs; however, they can also create opportunities for corruption and abuse of entrusted position, often for private gain.

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2.5 Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)

The access that international missions have to basic resources such as food, water and medication has in the past opened door to sexual abuse. This involves an abuse of entrusted powers – distribution of resources and keeping of peace – for private gratification.

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Mitigations within Risk Pathway 2. Relations with host nation stakeholders

Promoting strong integrity standards among mission personnel can help set expectations for relations with the host nation, and prevent creation of new opportunities for corrupt networks.

Supporting those who are willing to join legitimate, inclusive governance structures can help create an alternative to the power of corrupt networks.

Ensuring political support and resource flows to those with an interest in a peaceful, stable solution to the conflict.

Ensuring that financial flows do not exceed the host nation’s absorptive capacity will diminish the risk of diversion by corrupt networks; tying funding and assistance to improvements in governance can help create momentum for reform.

Supporting civilian initiatives such as reform of the judiciary can help create counter-balance to state capture, and using a full spectrum to shape incentives could render corruption less attractive at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Civil society organisations can be valuable allies in the fight against corruption, at a strategy-setting level and when attempting to limit low-level corruption that feeds higher-level networks.

Stronger oversight of mission resources will help limit opportunities for corrupt networks, and helping develop host nation or civil society oversight mechanisms will help create longer-term accountability of host nation forces.

Ensuring that the international mission is able to receive and process signals of wrongdoing increases the likelihood of detection and diminishes the appeal of corruption.